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국제학석사학위논문

**A Study on the United States' Coercive  
Diplomacy Strategy toward North Korea:  
the case of George W. Bush Administration, 2001-2009**

미국의 대북 핵문제 정책에 관한 연구: 조지 W. 부시  
대통령의 강압외교전략을 중심으로, 2001-2009 년

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**A Study on the United States' Coercive  
Diplomacy Strategy toward North Korea:  
the case of George W. Bush Administration, 2001-2009**

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
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
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## **Abstract**

The George W. Bush administration's policy toward North Korea was primarily based on hardline policy of strong pressure, while heavily criticizing its former administration's engagement policy as ineffective and failed. However, North Korea's first nuclear test was the watershed event that changed Bush administration's policy toward North Korea from hardline to accommodation. But despite the policy shift, Bush administration couldn't achieve disablement process in North Korea by the end of its term in office. This thesis made an attempt to analyze factors of Bush administration's policy toward North Korea which led to success or failure to its objectives, with the analytical framework based on the theory of 'Coercive Diplomacy'. For phase one (January 2001- October 2006), which primarily comprised of hardline policy toward North Korea, it turned out that the US' coercer strategy of 'tacit ultimatum' during this phase is lack of proportionality and reciprocity with solely high level of coercive credibility. However, in phase two (November 2006 – October 2007), which was basically accommodative approach dominant period, it appears that Bush administration employed strategy of 'gradual turning of the screw' mixed with 'carrot and stick approach'. And all three element of coercer strategy were well balanced along with strong international support and limited domestic opposition, which led to limited success for US. In phase three (November 2007 – January 2009), US strategy of 'try and see approach' lacked balance with decreased reciprocity and coercive credibility along with lack of active support from the regional actors. And these factors led to failure of Bush administration to complete disablement process in North Korea after all. Applying this analytical framework, the US coercive diplomacy strategy turned out to be successful only when US' coercer strategy of proportionality, reciprocity and coercive credibility are well balanced along with active international and domestic support.

**Keywords: George W. Bush Administration, US Policy Toward North Korea, Coercive Diplomacy, First Nuclear Test, Denuclearization, Disablement**

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## **List of Abbreviations**

<b>ABC</b>	Anything But Clinton
<b>BDA</b>	Banco Delta Asia
<b>CBRN</b>	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
<b>CVID</b>	Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement
<b>DMZ</b>	Demilitarized Zone
<b>DPRK</b>	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
<b>HEUP</b>	Highly Enriched Uranium Program
<b>HFO</b>	Heavy Fuel Oil
<b>IAEA</b>	International Atomic Energy Agency
<b>ICBM</b>	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
<b>KEDO</b>	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
<b>LWR</b>	Light Water Reactor
<b>NLL</b>	Northern Limit Line
<b>NPR</b>	Nuclear Posture Review
<b>NPT</b>	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
<b>NSS</b>	National Security Strategy
<b>PSI</b>	Proliferation Security Initiative
<b>QDR</b>	Quadrennial Defense Review
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>WMD</b>	Weapons of Mass Destruction

# **I. INTRODUCTION**

## **1. Background**

### **1-1. The Clinton Administration's Policy toward North Korea**

In late 2016, during a closed-door meeting provided by a big financial company in Hong Kong, the former president Bill Clinton was asked what was the most regrettable decision made during his term at the White House. He allegedly responded by saying that he regretted by not having carried out air strike against North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facilities in June 1994, considering the fact that North Korea's continuing development of nuclear weapons and missiles and their advancement of capabilities so far.<sup>1</sup> While his remarks were not officially made, it brings into question that why great power such as United States couldn't halt North Korea's aggression of developing and testing nuclear weapons? Why couldn't United States coerce North Korea into abandon its nuclear programs? The year of 1993-94 was often referred to as "the first North Korean nuclear crisis", since North Korea denied the inspection by IAEA and declared that they would withdraw from NPT on Mar 12, 1993. Two months later, the United Nation Security Council Resolution 825 was adopted to call for North Korea to return to

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<sup>1</sup> Hyun-ki Kim, "Strategic Impatience," review of Korea Joongang Daily, April 4 2017, <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3031792> (Accessed May 9, 2017).

NPT and urged it to allow inspection by IAEA.<sup>2</sup> Underlying problem was that North Korea was not adhering to safeguards agreement with IAEA, since allowing inspection would expose their clandestine nuclear program. Following bilateral talks with the United States, North Korea suspended its decision to withdraw from NPT and decided to allow inspections by IAEA. However, North Korea this time again refused to allow inspection at Yongbyon reprocessing facilities on Mar 21, 1994, bringing about IAEA's resolution against North Korea to allow all required inspections. Finally, North Korea declared to withdraw from the IAEA. With escalated tension on the Korean peninsula, the Clinton administration was reviewing all the options on the table to deal with North Korea's nuclear program. The military option to air strike North Korea's nuclear facilities was clearly one of them. The credibility of pushing for this option was so high that many people in South Korea were buying up a large quantity of daily necessities such as water and food for the fear of incoming all-out war that they might encounter. However, the Clinton administration finally decided to solve the problem diplomatically rather than militarily. The former president Jimmy Carter's visit to North Korea amid this crisis was one of the factors for attenuating the tensions.<sup>3</sup> After negotiating with North Korea, he acquired its confirmed willingness to freeze its nuclear programs while resuming bilateral talks on the high level to settle down issues at stake. Under this less

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<sup>2</sup> United.Nations.Security.Council, "Resolution 825," <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/280/49/IMG/N9328049.pdf?OpenElement> (Accessed January 1, 2018).

<sup>3</sup> Joel S. Wit, *Going Critical : The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis* / Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, ed. Daniel Poneman and Robert L. Gallucci (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 192-200.

strenuous political climate, both US and North Korea reached a deal to adopt the Agreed Framework in Geneva on October 21 in the same year, which called for North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities in exchange for its receiving of two Light Water Reactors(LWRs) and annual shipment of heavy fuel oil(HFO) based on a three steps process.<sup>4</sup> Since Agreed Framework was adopted by both parties, the tension on the peninsula significantly decreased. North Korea allowed inspection to verify compliances with the IAEA regulation and took a freeze measure to its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a multilateral organization, was constructed in order to assist finance LWR projects and shipment of HFO for North Korea.<sup>5</sup> However, there had been disagreement over missile proliferation issue between US and North Korea since 1996. The US was wary of North Korea over its transfer of missile to such as Iran and Pakistan. In 1998, North Korea conducted long-range missile test for the first time ever by launching Taepodong-1 missile which flew over Japan.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, US had a concern over North Korea's suspected underground nuclear facilities at Kumchang-ni. North Korea's series of provocations listed above could lead up to another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, but US rather held several bilateral talks, including high-level's, to settle down the issues. In the process of bilateral negotiations, North Korea allowed US inspection team at

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<sup>4</sup> Arms Control Association, "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Missile Diplomacy," <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron> (Accessed May 9), 4.

<sup>5</sup> US Department of State, "Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," <https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31009.htm> (Accessed January 1, 2018).

<sup>6</sup> Arms Control Association, "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Missile Diplomacy," 7.



Kumchang-ni, where they found no evidence of nuclear related activity, and agreed to a moratorium on testing any long-range missiles during the talks period. After series of diplomatic effort, US and North Korea issued Joint Communiqué in October 2000, which included implementation of issues such as peace treaty, economic cooperation, agreed Framework and Humanitarian assistance.<sup>7</sup> A few days later, the US Secretary of State Albright visited North Korea to meet with Kim Jong-Il and discussed over pending issues, which further significantly lowered the tension. Although the US-DPRK Summit meeting couldn't take place during Clinton's term due to pending issues in the Middle East, the bilateral relations appear to be in such a good mood at that time. Overall, the Clinton Administration's policy toward North Korea is primarily characterized by engagement, which is based on solving issues through diplomatic negotiations, which continued until the end of his term.

## **1-2. The Bush Administration's Policy toward North Korea**

However, when George W. Bush started his administration in 2001, he strongly criticized the former government's incapability to achieve denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. As such, Bush pushed for ABC (Anything but Clinton) policy, which he tried to implement the policies which was in the opposite direction from the

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<sup>7</sup> US Department of State, "U.S.-D.P.R.K. Joint Communiqué," [https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eap/001012\\_usdprk\\_jointcom.html](https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eap/001012_usdprk_jointcom.html) (Accessed January 1, 2018).

predecessor.<sup>8</sup> There were no significant changes to NK policy for the first eight months. He wanted to negotiate with North Korea, including improved implementation of the Agreed Framework. However, since 9/11 there had been drastic changes to its policy. Bush declared 'War on Terror' and characterized North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, as 'Axis of Evil', which are threatening the world peace.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, when James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East-Asian and Pacific affairs, paid a visit to North Korea, he found out that North Korea had secretly launched a HEUP (Highly Enriched Uranium Program), which was apparently the violation of the Agreed Framework.<sup>10</sup> This was the beginning of the second nuclear crisis and ever since this event Bush started to implement hardline policy toward North Korea. Influenced by his neoconservative staffs, his policy was characterized by moralistic approach toward North Korea. North Korea, which was hindering the efforts of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons for its clandestine nuclear program, was clearly one of those evil states from the perspective of the US. With lack of trust on North Korea, the US imposed dozens of sanctions against North Korea and denied bilateral talk. Rather, the US preferred six-party talk to deal with North Korean nuclear program. In others words, the US avoided direct talk with North Korea and wanted to increase pressure on them through multilateral settings in the hope that multilateral arrangement would increase more pressure to stop North Korea's

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<sup>8</sup> Mike Chinoy, *Meltdown : The inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* / Mike Chinoy (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2009), 43-55.

<sup>9</sup> The White House, "President Delivers State of the Union Address," <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (Accessed March 23, 2017).

<sup>10</sup> William James Perry, *My Journey at the Nuclear Brink* / William J. Perry (Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2015).

nuclear program. On September 19, 2005, in the fourth round of six-party talk, the participants from six countries finally reached an agreement to conclude a joint statement requiring North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear program.<sup>11</sup>

In the meantime, fundamental questions in this research are centered especially around the year of 2006. That year was the period when North Korea launched long-range missiles and did its first nuclear test. On July 4<sup>th</sup>, North Korea test fired seven ballistic missiles including its longest-range missiles by then. In response to NK's missile tests, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1695 condemning North Korea's missile launches. As opposed to international community's will to hinder proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, North Korea seemed not bound by such resolution. On October 9<sup>th</sup>, 2006, North Korea, in return, conducted its first nuclear test near the village of Punggye. This was the critical moment for the US to make a sharper choice to respond to North Korea's worst-ever provocation. Testing a nuclear weapon itself was not only a violation of UN resolutions but also it posed grave threat to regional peace and security in East Asia. Although there had been frequent warnings against North Korea, they ignored them by testing a nuclear weapon. Therefore, it was the right time to show United States' strong willingness, which was generally in line with Bush's hardline approach toward North Korea, to abandon such a threatening provocation. However, the US' response to NK's first nuclear test was far from expectation. US rather responded by switching to take softer approach to North Korea to negotiate rather than

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<sup>11</sup> US Department of State, "Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks," <https://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm> (Accessed January 1, 2018).

taking harsher measures on them.

Ever since North Korea launched its first nuclear test, the US hardline policy toward North Korea gradually changed over the time, which primarily appeared on the surface in the second term of Bush administration. There were evidences for this argument. First, the Republican Party was soundly defeated by the Democrats in the midterm election in early November 2006, which was held less than a month from North Korea's first nuclear test. After this, hawkish neoconservatives such as Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, resigned due to strong opposition and criticism from the factors of US domestic politics. Second, Bush administration opted to push ahead bilateral talks with North Korea for the first time, as opposed to its willingness to maintain only multilateral approach to deal with NK in the past. Third, the US agreed to unfreeze the \$25 million of North Korea's funds frozen in its Banco Delta Asia account, which was suspected to be used as their illegal money laundry.<sup>12</sup> Fourth, the US removed North Korea from the list of State Sponsors of terrorism. Fifth, US released restriction on trade for North Korea under the act of trading with enemy. This evidence clearly shows the reversed track US took on North Korea.

As such, the US was trying to lower the temperature ever since North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon. There were only a few measures with which US tried to respond to North Korea's ever unprecedented provocation accordingly. It was the UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which imposed additional sanctions on commerce

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<sup>12</sup> Chinoy, *Meltdown : The inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* / Mike Chinoy, 252-273.

with North Korea, widening the range of prohibited transactions beyond those banned under Resolution 1695.<sup>13</sup> Other than that, there were lack of evidence for Bush administration's major scale punitive reactions to North Korea's first nuclear test. Indeed, it is quite contrasting measures taken against North Korea, since the essence of Bush administration's hardline policy, also known as 'Bush Doctrine' was based on containment policy with possible preemptive strike on those rogue states or 'axis of evil' states.

## **2. Puzzles & Research Questions**

### **2-1. Puzzles**

Taking a view of the US policies toward North Korea for the last 20 years, there were lack of consistency and persistence, which is especially the case during Bush administration. Although Bush started his administration with strong criticism over the former government's impotent engagement policy toward North Korea and started implementing its ever-strongest hardline policy against North Korea, they returned to their predecessor's path such as engagement policy when they realized that hawkish approach didn't even work to change stance of North Korea regarding its nuclear policy. This approach only aggravated the situation according to North Korea's tit-for-tat

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<sup>13</sup> Arms Control Association, "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Missile Diplomacy," 17-18.

strategy.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, under the democratic institutions, both the US and South Korea change their respective presidents every four and five years (or ten years for the US in case of a president elected two terms) and there has been significant policy changes depending on the preferences of those presidents and circulating high officials in charge of North Korea's nuclear issues in contrast to North Korea's authoritarian system's consistent policy under single exclusive leadership with relatively stationary positions of high officials in Foreign Ministry, which is one of the weaknesses for United States or South Korea to deal with North Korean's nuclear problem.

The United States' reaction to North Korea's first nuclear test was indeed far from expectation. From North Korean perspective, despite the risk it may bring, by testing a nuclear test, they achieved their goal by making US to be back on bilateral talk with them to negotiate on the issue in their favorable position. It seemed as if Goliath such as United States was being dragged down by a tiny David's provocation such as North Korea, which is quite a weird situation. In another word, the strongest power avoided escalating the tension and took a few steps backward and changed its policy due to a small country's hostile act. In this light, the US sent a wrong signal by making North Korea and the third-party countries to believe that even small countries can have a serious impact on strong power's policy and restrict their strategic maneuver space.

In the meantime, since the Bush administration switched to more

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<sup>14</sup> Peter Howard, "Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy," review of *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 4 (2004): 805-828.

accommodative approach, which is generally similar with his predecessor's engagement policy, after North Korea's nuclear tests in October 2006, United States could draw important agreement with North Korea through six party talks such as February 13<sup>th</sup> and October 3<sup>rd</sup> deal in 2007, which specified phased implementation of September 19<sup>th</sup> of Joint Statement in 2005.<sup>15</sup> And it appeared that the implementation of the Joint Statement was making smooth progress when North Korea destroyed its cooling tower at Yongbyon Nuclear facilities in June 2008, broadcasting live to show the scene of their demolition site.<sup>16</sup> However, Bush administration couldn't disable North Korea's nuclear facilities in the end due to disagreement over verification protocols. And this remain unsolved and was passed on to next administration's burden of task, which soon had to face North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009. In a sense, important agreements over North Korea's nuclear program was made during the Bush administration through six party talks. But in terms of implementation of them, it was much more difficult than reaching consensus in the negotiation tables.

Also, the element of international support was important factor in dealing with North Korea's nuclear issue, though how much the factor influenced remain unanswered. As Bush administration initially pushed ahead multilateral negotiation rather than bilateral one, they already realized that bilateral diplomatic pressure is not credible enough to change North Korea's strategy of nuclear brinksmanship. Although there was

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<sup>15</sup> US Department of State, "Initial Actions to Implement Six-Party Joint Statement," <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80508.htm> (Accessed January 1, 2018).

<sup>16</sup> Chinoy, *Meltdown : The inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* / Mike Chinoy, 340-352.

apparently divergent views and preference on North Korea among participant countries in the six party talks, having North Korea to abandon its nuclear program were common goals, at least officially for the other five participants. But still exerting pressure on North Korea through this multilateral negotiation table was not enough.

China played a prominent role as presiding country for the six party talks to settle down the North Korea's nuclear issues. They were actively engaged in communication between US and North Korea through such as "shuttle diplomacy" especially when US denied any bilateral talks with North Korea, shutting down any of its bilateral channels. Despite its prominent role as symbolic figure, their substantive role in denuclearization of the peninsula is beyond question. Russia has been traditionally holding US in check in multilateral institutions such as UNSC along with China. Japan has been closely working with United States in terms of dealing with North Korea's nuclear issue but another priority for them was in solving abductee issue, which has been unsettled since 1977. Furthermore, South Korea's divergent approach of sunshine policy or sunshine 2.0 during this period also posed as hindrance to Bush's hardline policy toward North Korea.

Whatever Bush administration strategically or tactically modified its policy toward North Korea and however other regional countries of six party talks sincerely assisted in US policy orientation toward North Korea, Bush administration failed to denuclearize or induce them to freeze and disable their nuclear facilities in the end. So, what went wrong with its North Korean policy?



## **2-2. Research Questions**

Therefore, by analyzing those various factors, this research will make an attempt to find answers to this fundamental question of “Why did a strong world power US find it so difficult to bend North Korea’s willingness so much weaker than itself?” And this big question is further divided into four small research questions such as “Why couldn’t Bush administration retain its hardline policy toward North Korea?”, “Was North Korean policies pursued by Bush administration effectively induce North Korea’s changes? To what degree?”, “Why Bush administration failed to operationalize its disabling of North Korea’s nuclear programs by the end of its term?”, and “How much of the regional or international factors (primarily other countries in the six party talks) affected US’ policy toward North Korea?”

## **3. Existing Literature Review**

The existing literature regarding George W. Bush administration’s policy toward North Korea can be generally categorized into following five sections. Followings are the specified explanations for each category.

### **3-1. Focus on Policy Change**

The literature under the first category focuses primarily on the policy change which occurred in both 2005 and 2006. Some say watershed event was the start over

with the second term administration while other argue that North Korea's first nuclear test in October 2006 was the clear division of policy change toward North Korea. The prevailing argument is that domestic politics was the most influential factors in changing Bush administration's policy of confrontation to accommodation.

Existing accounts of the Bush administration's change in policy toward North Korea from confrontation to accommodation fall into five broad categories.<sup>17</sup>

The first explanation deals with the evolving security situation on the Korean Peninsula. Since North Korea declared its nuclear weapon state, the security dynamics around Korean peninsula became different. As North Korea's heading toward the nuclear weapon state, the tension on the peninsula escalated and adjacent countries such as South Korea and Japan might want to nuclearize its state in the worst scenario. And a stalemate of Iraq war was enough for Bush administration to tactically change their posture against North Korea, otherwise pushing ahead with hardline options would likely to bring more predicaments and oppositions. So, for the US to denuclearize North Korea, it would try more accommodative approach rather than stick to its confrontational stance. This is also referred to as "Tactical Posture Change Model(TPCM)."<sup>18</sup>

The second explanation emphasizes the effects of domestic politics on foreign

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<sup>17</sup> R. P. Pardo, "The Bush Administration and North Korea: Explaining Policy Change through Soft Balancing," review of Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 26, no. 3 (2014): 333-349.

<sup>18</sup> Byoung Kwon Sohn, "Bush's Turn to Bilateral Talks with North Korea," [Articles : Bush's Turn to Bilateral Talks with North Korea.] review of The Korean Journal of Security Affairs 52, no. 1 (2009): 29-51.

policy. The November 2006 US midterm election reflected American's broad opposition to Bush administration's foreign policy. This also had significant influence in US policy toward North Korea. As a result, the Republican party was defeated and the Democratic party regained its dominant position. And this factor had an effect on changes to foreign policy toward North Korea in the Bush Administration.<sup>19</sup>

The third explanation focuses on the evolution of the policy making process during the Bush Administration. There were significant changes to personnel related with policy toward North Korea during the second term of Bush administration. Condoleezza Rice replaced Colin Powell as Secretary of State, and most of hawkish officials left office in 2005 and the following year such as Donald Rumsfeld, John Bolton and Robert Joseph. And as an Under Secretary of state, Christopher Hill, who was in favor of accommodative negotiation and later played important role in establishing robust diplomatic channel with North Korea, was appointed.<sup>20</sup>

The fourth explanation sees the policy shift as coming from Bush's concern about his foreign policy legacy after stepping down.<sup>21</sup> Since his policy toward Iraq failed and faced strong opposition from all over the place, he wanted to improve his image by negotiating with North Korea to reach a deal to achieve the goal of denuclearization of North Korea. This model accounts for Bush's primary motivation behind February 29<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Pardo, "The Bush Administration and North Korea: Explaining Policy Change through Soft Balancing," 337.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 335.

<sup>21</sup> Sohn, "Bush's Turn to Bilateral Talks with North Korea," 40.

agreement with North Korea in 2007. This is also called “Presidential Legacy Pursuit Model” (PLPM)<sup>22</sup>.

The fifth explanation accounts for the five-other participants of the six party talks such as China, Russia, South Korea, North Korea and Japan, employed soft-balancing approach to modify the stance of Bush administration hardline policy toward North Korea. They undermined the policies of hawkish officials while supporting the policies of their dovish counterparts.

Notable things about above explanations are that none of them constitutes a mono-causal explanation on the causes of policy change toward north Korea. Authors who argued for above reasons presented at least two or three reasons combined to account for the changes.

Ramon argued that China, Russia, South Korea and at times Japan and North Korea employed soft-balancing to modify the position of the Bush administration during the second North Korean nuclear crisis. Since these five other countries were well aware of the fact that there was division of policy line into hawks and doves toward North Korea, so these five countries were able to weaken its hardline policy while strengthening softline proponent's position. But soft balancing was not the only factor for the change. He suggested that bureaucratic politics and trans-governmental coalitions (i.e. the six party talks) factors are strengthening soft balancing element for the policy

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 41-43.

changes. He also contended that this soft balancing factors could affect US' decision-making process.<sup>23</sup>

Sohn attempted to explain Bush's policy change toward North Korea on the basis of three main reasons. First reason is that given the stalemate of US' invasion of Iraq and neoconservatives' waning power, there has been policy shift. Second cause is that there was power shift from Department of State to Department of defense. Last one is that Bush himself was concerned about outcomes of his foreign policies after leaving White House, considering his reputation as presidential legacy. While he did not prioritize three main causes above, he instead suggested that these complex factors were contributing to policy shift for the Bush Administration to North Korean nuclear issues.<sup>24</sup>

Jonas' explanation of policy reversal is somewhat different from dominant preexisting literature. While he listed growing crisis on the Korean peninsula, US' domestic politics and changing decision making process within Bush administration as existing explanations for the policy shift, he refuted all these factors and rather offered an alternative explanation. He argued that Bush administration altered its policy since it perceived fundamentally improved prospects for fruitful cooperation on North Korea's denuclearization. Namely, US decisionmaker's strategic calculation about future prospects on cooperation between US and North Korea was favorable for the US to take negotiation measures rather than simply change of members inside the cabinet or

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<sup>23</sup> Pardo, "The Bush Administration and North Korea: Explaining Policy Change through Soft Balancing," 333.

<sup>24</sup> Sohn, "Bush's Turn to Bilateral Talks with North Korea," 126.

departments after term change or domestic election.<sup>25</sup>

### **3-2. Focus on Policy Failure**

The second category focuses on the failure of the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea. The common argument in this category is that Bush's policy toward North Korea failed during this period.

Charles L. Pritchard is the former special envoy to North Korea during Bush administration's initial period and wrote a book, 'Failed Diplomacy', focusing primarily on the failure factors in US' policy during Bush administration toward North Korea. He explained that there are three main factors for the failure. First reason is US' moralistic approach and cost of words. Bush declared North Korea as 'Axis of Evil', with Iran and Iraq. Also, North Korea was depicted as "Outpost of Tyranny", while his leader was called such as "Pygmy" and "Spoiled child." Bush's administration maintained its basic stance, which they do not reward for bad actions. This political rhetoric and inflexible moralistic approach became hindrance to reinitiate negotiation with North Korea. Second factor is US' denial of bilateral talk with North Korea. While US pursued six-party talks as only channel to deal with North Korea, the author pointed out that US lost its opportunity to stop North Korea from on its way to nuclear weapon state in its first term. The last reason was in deterioration of US-ROK relations during this time. There

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<sup>25</sup> Jonas Schneider, The Change toward Cooperation in the George W. Bush Administration's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy toward North Korea (New York: Peter Lang, 2010), 131-132.

had been discrepancy between Kim Dae-Jung's sunshine policy and US' policy toward North Korea. And US was ignorant of the South Korea's position, which he thought that coordination with South Korea should be one of the key tasks to pursue its North Korea policy. Since Bush administration failed to freeze and abandon North Korea's nuclear weapons, Charles argued that Bush's eight years of North Korea policy failed.<sup>26</sup>

Nicholas defined failure of policy as series of defeats and retreats for Bush team with North Korea, although they often issued tough talk about North Korea and its leader. Furthermore, North Korea's nuclear arsenal at the end of Bush's term grew much bigger than initial period. Despite harsh rhetoric such as "freedom on the march" and "axis of evil" against North Korea, its system still remained utterly repressive and uncompromisingly unreformed. Nicholas highlighted three mistakes that Bush's team made during their terms of office. First one is ideological and narrowly moralistic view of North Korea. Second one is Bush team's avoidance to negotiation with North Korea. And the last one is their failure to understand potential breakthrough which could be made by high level dialogue between US and North Korea without any preconditions.<sup>27</sup>

Graham argue that the failure of the Bush administration's North Korean policy is a brute fact, which is hard to ignore. US couldn't stop North Korea's accumulation of plutonium transferrable into nuclear weapons, though US has repeatedly declared North

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<sup>26</sup> Charles L. Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy : The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb* / Charles L. Pritchard (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 1-3.

<sup>27</sup> Nicholas Eberstadt, "What Went Wrong? The Bush Administration's Failed North Korea Policy.(George W. Bush)," review of *The Weekly Standard* 14, no. 18 (2009): 20-22.

Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons intolerable by threatening to topple its regime. And North Korea was being left unobstructed on its path to acquire status as a nuclear state. As he contended that the most serious threat is nuclear terrorism, North Korea's continuous development of its nuclear weapons is worrisome. He suggested that the best hope for success is that China take the lead in effectively freezing of nuclear activities while giving North Korea benefits through six party talks, which would lead to ultimate dismantlement of its nuclear weapons infrastructure.<sup>28</sup>

James argued that Bush team's neoconservative advisors implemented hardline policy toward North Korea, which strained relations with South Korea and raised position of China, forcing North Korea to push ahead its nuclear weapons program as an act of self-defense. While he argued that agreed framework in 1994 was the ideal bilateral agreement at the moment, Bush administration's hawk engagement approach led to discard the existing framework and thereby US was afflicted with serious damages on its security interests. He defined Bush administration's policy failure as creating new danger of North Korea selling nuclear weapons to terrorists outside the Korean peninsula.<sup>29</sup>

### **3-3. Focus on US Policy in the Strategic Context**

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<sup>28</sup> Graham Allison, "North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Bush Administration Failure, China's Opportunity," review of *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 18, no. 3 (2006): 7-34.

<sup>29</sup> James Matray, "A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas," review of *Korean Studies* 31 (2007): 97-99, 119.



The third category is focusing on Bush administration's overall policy toward North Korea. Different from the second category is that these literatures provide wider perspective as to reviewing Bush administration's policy toward North Korea in a strategic context rather than exclusively focusing on the failure factors itself.

Van explained why US and North Korea could manage to experience frequent crisis without escalation to war since the Korean War. He described US-North Korea relations as a pattern of rivalry interaction. Despite significant disparity in power, he defined rivalry as each state's high expectation of future conflict with the other. He drew on the concept of reputation. The past behavior of two states shows the reason and the time they made decision about credibility and resolve of the other in the series of action. According to him, the pattern of rivalry shows that US' backdown from North Korea's coercion didn't help to ease the tension and hostility. He employed the concept of reputation into North Korea's nuclear crisis along with Pueblo crisis, the shoot-down of EC-121, Panmunjom Crisis, North South Rivalry pattern in 2010 for the case studies. In case of nuclear crisis of 2002-09, he pointed out that US backed down from its challenges while dismissed North Korean threats, which led to increase of frequency or intensity of future challenges despite future threat's credibility is unknown.<sup>30</sup>

Jaechun and David attempted to compare the Bush administration's policy

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<sup>30</sup> Van Jackson, *Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in Us-North Korea Relations*/ Van Jackson, Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1-15.

toward Iraq and North Korea. The Bush administration responded to Iraq's threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by using forces, while it restrained to do so with North Korea, which it is expected to possess more developed WMDs, which presents to conventional realism.<sup>31</sup> Using realist theory, he argued that Iraq and North Korea had different meanings in terms of Bush's grand strategy. He pointed out that Bush's foreign policy consisted of two-pronged strategy of seeking to sustain the hegemonic status of US in the world. One was to enhance its capability to intervene and another was to secure more oil from other states. In this regard, he drew conclusions that Iraq was more ideal target for US than North Korea to intervene by using force whereas invading North Korea would bring vehement oppositions from China. Using offensive realist's logic of rationality of state behavior, he pointed out that "even most powerful states choose their targets carefully and US would have calculated that allowing China to continue growing and relying on a balancing coalition to contain it down the road.", rather than taking a risky policy which would draw Chinese intervention, the reminiscent of US' fear for massive influx of Chinese Army into the peninsula during Korean War.<sup>32</sup>

Wade compared the confrontation between US and North Korea to David and Goliath from the Biblical parable. David, who was a tiny boy armed with only a slingshot, fell the giant Goliath. Despite Goliath's prevailing preponderance, David identified

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<sup>31</sup> J. Kim and D. Hundt, "Us Policy toward Rogue States: Comparing the Bush Administration's Policy toward Iraq and North Korea," *review of Asian Perspective* 35, no. 2 (2011): 239-57.

<sup>32</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* / John J. Mearsheimer (New York: Norton, 2001), 252.

Goliath's weaknesses and successfully exploited its opponent's vulnerability, winning his game of confrontation. In the meantime, Wade placed great emphasis on the role of the six-party talks, arguing that these multilateral settings have been considered a potential precursor to a bigger West Asian cooperative security regime. Also, he further pointed out that "as long as Bush's team maintain its ideational preference for emancipatory militancy over multilateralism, the regional security cooperation would be hard to achieve."<sup>33</sup>

### **3-4. Focus on US Approach to the Solution of North Korea's Nuclear Program**

The US approach to the solution of North Korea's nuclear program suggested by scholars of international relations can be generally classified into following four approaches – appeasement, engagement, hawk engagement and regime change.<sup>34</sup>

The first approach is appeasement policy. Gregory argued that US should facilitate environment in order to make North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs. He suggested normalization of US-DPRK relations and institutionalize the six party talks as multilateral security framework for confidence building measures.<sup>35</sup> Bennett

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<sup>33</sup> Wade L. Huntley, "U.S. Policy toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliath's Fate," review of *Asian Survey* 47, no. 3 (2007): 455-80.

<sup>34</sup> Seong Man Kim, "A Study on the Bush Administration's "Coercive Diplomacy" toward North Korea and North Korea's "Counter-Strategies"" (PhD diss., Yonsei University, 2011), 27.

<sup>35</sup> G. J. Moore, "America's Failed North Korea Nuclear Policy: A New Approach," review of *Asian Perspective* 32, no. 4 (2008): 9-27.

proposed that US recognize North Korea's nuclear weapons and diplomatically approve them as normal country out of concern that North Korea might export nuclear materials overseas and employ the actual use of nuclear weapon in the contingencies.<sup>36</sup>

The second approach is engagement policy. This one is achieved North Korea's denuclearization by implementing roadmap such building peace regime on the Korean peninsula and US-DPRK normalization. David pointed out that North Korea had the intention to carry out reform or open-door policy to some degree. So, he argued that by signing mutual non-aggression agreement, peace agreement and renormalization, these can lead to eventual settlement of the North Korea's nuclear program. Michael and Mike saw that grand bargain strategy is necessary, which contains comprehensive solution to deal with North Korea's nuclear, missile, forgery, drugs and human right issues as well as signing peace agreement and normalization at the same time. Leon pointed out that containment policy is not desirable option to achieve its goal. He emphasized element of give and takes diplomacy is very important, while he pointed out that Bush administrations' pure coercion brought about North Korea's nuclear armament rather than non-proliferation. Joel argued that it is impossible for US to solve north Korea's nuclear program by exerting political and economic pressure, only engagement policy can achieve US goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, he suggested that US need to broaden the agenda to include not only disarmament of their

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<sup>36</sup> Bennett Ramberg, "Living with Nuclear North Korea," review of *Survival* 51, no. 4 (2009): 13-20.

nuclear programs but also other economic or political reward to them as well.<sup>37</sup>

The third approach is hawk engagement. What makes different feature with engagement policy is that this approach requires precondition, such as freeze of North Korea's nuclear facilities, in order to engage them thereafter. Although inducement is proposed for improving bargaining power in the negotiation, if North Korea do not agree with their suggestion, US will implement containment measures to solve the North Korea's nuclear program. Victor D. Cha saw that the possibility of North Korea's abandoning its nuclear programs is significantly low, so he argued that North Korea should return to implement freeze of nuclear facilities in advance as they agreed to so in the Agreed Framework in 1994.<sup>38</sup> Nicholas Eberstadt criticized Bush administration's adoption of 2.13 agreement after North Korea's first nuclear test as absence of their Plan B to further strengthen their ongoing punitive measures. He argued consistent implementation of containment such as strengthening Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and continuation of financial sanctions.<sup>39</sup> This approach features the requirement of North Korea's pre-actions in order to reciprocate. Also, hawk engagement does not pursue regime change, but proponents of this approach expect pressure exerted on North Korea would bring about instability of their regime and this crisis of regime collapse

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<sup>37</sup> Kim, "A Study on the Bush Administration's "Coercive Diplomacy" toward North Korea and North Korea's "Counter-Strategies", " 28-32.

<sup>38</sup> Victor D. Cha, "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," review of *International Security* 27, no. 1 (2002): 40-78.

<sup>39</sup> Eberstadt, "What Went Wrong? The Bush Administration's Failed North Korea Policy.(George W. Bush)," 24-25.

would solve the North Korea's nuclear issue.

The last approach is policy of regime change. This approach is pursuing North Korea's dismantlement of their Nuclear programs through regime change. Proponents of this approach sees that it is nearly impossible for North Korea to abandon their nuclear weapons, inducement measures are considered void to solution for denuclearization. Max Boot saw that the biggest concern for US security is the possibility of rogue states sharing nuclear weapons, while developing without impediments. He argued that pursuing regime change in Pyongyang and Tehran is the only solution.<sup>40</sup> Mark Fitzpatrick saw that North Korea's development of nuclear weapons is for their survival, so they will never abandon. He argued that US need to show its willingness to pressure North Korea's regime by imposing strong sanctions against them.<sup>41</sup>

### **3-5. Focus on US Coercion Strategy**

The last category is focusing on US coercion strategy toward North Korea. Distinguished from second and third category above are that these literatures have underlying assumption that US pursued coercion strategy toward North Korea throughout the period of North Korea's nuclear crisis. While overall assessment on US policy toward North Korea appear to be similar, this is peculiar that it assessed US' North Korea in the context of focusing on Coercion or coercive diplomacy theory.

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<sup>40</sup> Max Boot, "Neocons," review of Foreign Policy, no. 140 (2004): 20-28.

<sup>41</sup> Mark Fitzpatrick, "Stopping Nuclear North Korea," review of Survival 51, no. 4 (2009): 5-12.

Dong-sun analyzed cases of compellence against North Korea, which included Pueblo incidents, Panmunjom Incidents, the first and second nuclear crisis, North Korea's invasion of NLL and Yeonpyeong Bombardment. He categorized methods of compellence into four – punishment, risk, decapitation and denial. Punishment threaten a target state to inflict pain and damage unless they change their behavior. The concept of risk is similar with punishment except for the former gradually incrementing the pressure. Decapitation is the elimination of target state's leadership or neutralization so that target state cannot resist. Denial is the elimination of target state's capability to achieve its goals. With these tools of compellence, he concluded that US employed punishment and decapitation strategy during second nuclear crisis, though the actual use of force did not occur, and it failed to achieve its goals. He pointed out that denial strategy is the most effective one among four measures of compellence, with which US and South Korea achieved its goals in both Panmoonjom crisis and North Korea's invasion of NLL, while punishment and decapitation are ineffective. He suggested that in order to compel North Korea, denial strategy should be devised and if it is infeasible, one should seek to find alternatives.<sup>42</sup>

In-ho & Young-seok and Jae-cheol's focus were US coercive diplomacy toward North Korea, using different concept than compellence. While compellence is in itself offensive in nature, relying on military capability, coercive diplomacy is defensive,

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<sup>42</sup> Dong-Sun Lee, "Compelling North Korea: Accomplishments and Strategies," review of *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (2012): 119-151.

solving issues diplomatically while holding the possibility of limited use of force. They both analyzed with similar analytical framework of success factors of coercion, which include objective, capability, credibility, communication, alternative, and sense of urgency. While the US had firm objective against North Korea and enough capability to coerce North Korea, US couldn't employ its capability properly. As for other remaining factors, the authors pointed out that US lacked all in the element of communication, alternative, and sense of urgency. Jae-cheol suggested that US need to maintain approach as followings -- 1) to maintain its objective of denuclearization, 2) to facilitate various types of negotiation channels including 6 party talks, US-DPRK bilateral talks and South-North bilateral talks, 3) to increase capability of ROK-US alliance's detection and strike capability, and 4) to utilize "strong coercion measures" along with "striking incentives" against North Korea.<sup>43</sup> In-ho & Young-seok's suggestion is overall similar with Jae-cheol's, but they further pointed out that settling down North Korea's nuclear issues on the basis of Complete, Verifiable, Identifiable Dismantlement (CVID) and further facilitating cooperation with China.<sup>44</sup>

### **3-6. Critique of Existing Literatures**

So far, the five broad categories of literatures regarding Bush administration's

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<sup>43</sup> Jaecheol Kim, "Evaluation on Us Coercive Diplomacy toward North Korea Nuclear Issue and Alternative," review of Journal of Korean Political Science 20, no. 1 (2012): 175-193.

<sup>44</sup> In Ho Lee and Young Seok Kim, "Analysis of U.S. Coercive Diplomacy to Solve the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Improvement Measures," review of The Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 1 (2015): 91-118.



policy toward North Korea have been briefly summarized. While literatures from each category mentioned above cannot be overlooked, they need to be closely examined in order to narrow down into single focused subject for this work.

For the first category of policy change of Bush administration, it clearly explains background of how Bush administration shifted its policy from confrontation to accommodation. However, these literatures do not explain the effectiveness of each policies in detail. In other words, policy shift should be prominent features for Bush's policy toward North Korea but the change itself is not the focus of this research.

The second category of policy failure of Bush administration is closely related to the orientation of this work. However, the problems of these are that although each article suggests various reasons for the failure of Bush policy toward North Korea, there are lack of certain strong analytical frameworks to apply to figure out what went well and what went wrong. In order to draw lessons for the US's policy toward North Korea, a well-organized analytical framework is necessary for better explanatory power.

The third category of US policy toward North Korea in the strategic context is peculiar in that they focus on North Korea's nuclear program from the broader perspectives such as geopolitical or regional factors and implications of historical perception and so forth. However, the drawbacks of these are that there is lack of sufficient data for supporting evidences such as effectiveness of punitive measures (i.e. bilateral and multilateral sanctions), regarding how much regional and international factors affect US policy toward North Korean Nuclear issues. To increase explanatory

power, substantiated materials are essential.

The Fourth category of types of US approach to North Korea's nuclear issues give you backgrounds of what kind of approaches US could choose to pursue during Bush's administration at the time, and make us to think and discuss the effectiveness of each. However, these do not analyze the Bush administration's overall policy toward North Korea, rather they are closely related to policy recommendation or background materials of what kind of policies or suggested by scholars at that time.

The last category of US Coercion Strategy is also closely related with this research. The fundamental characteristic of US policy toward North Korea's nuclear issues is to change target state's behavior. Thus, the concept of coercion is closely associated, because it explains and determine whether coercion would work or not, while taking various factors into account. Using this concept, it is expected to answer those research questions above. Namely, why Bush administration couldn't coerce North Korea into abandon or freeze its nuclear weapons? What was the fundamental reasons for its failure? What can US learn from the cases of Bush's administration's policy toward North Korea? While the last category is the most relevant to orientation with this research, here is the limitations to the existing literatures.

The limitation of compellence strategy is that since it is based on actual use of military force to coerce target states, it takes lots of risks in implementing so. Literatures of US' coercive diplomacy toward North Korea are employing analytical framework of six elements of success factors. However, they do not take regional or international

factors into account in detail and there is lack of analysis on target state's counter strategy or domestic situations at the time.

In the meantime, "China" under the realm of regional factors should be one of the primary reasons why US' policy toward North Korea has failed for the past a few decades, since China is North Korea's biggest stakeholder and at the same time their ally. For example, China's stance toward UN Security Council resolution regarding sanctions against North Korea for its hostile acts of provocations has been passive as opposed to its active attitude in mediating bilateral relations between the US and North Korea in the form of presiding over six party talks. Since the great amount of the trade come from China to North Korea, the key to improve the effectiveness of sanctions wholly depend upon China's willingness to impose penalty for its bellicose behavior to threaten peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. And US-China relations should be added up to China factor, since this is one of the biggest factor which can affect the situation not only on the Korean peninsula but also East Asia from the broader perspective. In this regard, this China or regional factor should be closely examined as to prominent factors for the limitation of Bush administration's coercion strategy toward North Korea.

Also, there were lack of researches which focused on comparing between substantive effectiveness between confrontation and accommodative policy. Tracing back Bush Administration's policy of hawks and doves and comparing those two in terms of produced outcome for each would be fruitful work to draw some important lessons for the future US and South Korean policy makers' policy orientation.

## **II. THEORY & ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

### **1. Theory – Alexander L. George’s Coercive Diplomacy**

Reviewing existing literatures on Bush administration’s policy toward North Korea, the theory of coercive diplomacy turned out be most suitable and relevant one to analyze. Alexander L. George is the author who explained the fundamental concept of coercive diplomacy. And Bruce W. Jentleson is the one who explained US coercive diplomacy against Libya during 1981-2003, further developing his own analytical framework, primarily based up on Alexander’s fundamental concepts and definitions. This research will primarily base upon these two scholar’s suggested concepts and analytical framework, rather than selecting only one author’s article. Alexander’s work contains ample and clear ideas about the concept of coercive diplomacy and Jentleson’s work suggests well-organized and parsimonious analytical framework to apply with North Korean nuclear issues. Therefore, none of these two literatures are negligible in this analysis. To start with, the concepts and features of coercive diplomacy by Alexander will be explored, and then explanations on Jentleson’s analytical framework using Alexander’s theory of coercive diplomacy will be followed.

The basic idea of coercive diplomacy is to “back one’s demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent

enough to persuade him to comply with the demand.”<sup>45</sup> To simply put it, it is the combination of coercion and diplomacy. While a state coerces a target state to comply with his demand, coercer will rely on diplomatic measures. When the coercer need to use military force, it will have to be limited to exemplary use of force to persuade the target states to back down. If a state uses the actual military force against the target states, then the state’s strategy of coercive diplomacy fails. Thus, coercive diplomacy is totally defensive in nature.

In the meantime, the concept of coercive diplomacy need to be distinguished from other prominent concept of coercion. According to Byman and Waxman, the definition of coercion is “the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would.”<sup>46</sup> Coercion does not always lead to physical use of force, because compliance is the goal. Therefore, the concepts of coercion can be understood as exactly in the opposite meaning of violence, which is defined by Thomas Schelling.<sup>47</sup> His concept of violence is use the actual use of force against adversary to achieve its goals. When there is even higher chance to retain its forces without using them for attaining its goals,

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<sup>45</sup> Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion : Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* / Alexander L. George Foreword by Samuel W. Lewis (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 4-6.

<sup>46</sup> Daniel Byman, *The Dynamics of Coercion : American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* / Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman, ed. Matthew C. Waxman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 3-4.

<sup>47</sup> Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* / with a New Preface and Afterword by Thomas C. Schelling (New York: Yale University Press, 2008), 1-34.

violence has a meaning in itself always to use force. But the coercion can be best achieved when there is no need to use the actual force, thereby retaining its forces intact. This sounds very similar with Sun Tzu's, an ancient Chinese military strategist, principle that "the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy's army without fighting at all."<sup>48</sup> Namely, coercion allows a state to use organized violence against an adversary, but it can change adversary's behavior, by restraining itself, without relying on the actual use of force.

Coercion can be divided into compellence and deterrence. And compellence is a response to an encroachment already undertaken while deterrence is the strategy of preventing a target state from doing something which hasn't initiated. Again, the concept of compellence is divided according to usage of its properties of whether it is offensive and defensive. Offensive use of compellence is blackmail strategy. It employs "coercive threats aggressively to persuade a victim to give up something of value without putting up resistance." Now, the defensive use of compellence is termed coercive diplomacy. It implies "the possibility of a more flexible diplomacy that can employ noncoercive persuasion and accommodation as well as coercive threats." Therefore, coercive diplomacy can employ non-military sanctions against an adversary.<sup>49</sup> Below is the diagram which indicates different concepts of coercion. The use of threats can be


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<sup>48</sup> Sunzi, *The Art of War* / Sun-Tzu (Sunzi) Edited, Translated and with an Introduction by John Minford, ed. John Minford (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 2-5.

<sup>49</sup> Alexander L. George, *Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth Neal Waltz, 7th ed. *The Use of Force* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 70-76.

achieved through close coordination with proper communications to the opponent by signaling, bargaining and negotiating. Below diagram indicates the different concepts in the area of coercion, based on Alexander L. George, Daniel Byman, Mathew Waxman, and Thomas Schelling's works on this.

**Figure 1. Various Concepts of Coercion**



Coercive diplomacy is attractive because it is based on an economical way of achieving its goals. Namely, without bloodshed fighting or with less political and psychological cost, coercive diplomacy can attain its goals of changing adversary's behavior. Thus, it is more attractive than military strategy.<sup>50</sup> However, the chances of success for coercive diplomacy is only 32 percent, meaning lots of constraints, risks and uncertainties are lowering the effectiveness of this strategy.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* / Edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 231-250.

<sup>51</sup> Bruce W. Jentleson, "Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits in the Contemporary World," review of Policy Analysis Brief. The Stanley Foundation (2006).

There are four variants of coercive diplomacy strategy. The policymaker should decide four components, which are 1) demand of the opponent, 2) sense of urgency for compliance, 3) punishment to threaten for noncompliance and 4) whether to use conditional inducement with punishment or not. Depending how policymakers identify the first three variables for the strategy, it can be classified into four categories.<sup>52</sup>

The first one is ultimatum. This full-fledged ultimatum contains all three elements of clear demand, sense of urgency for compliance and credible threat of punishment for noncompliance of the opponent. Although this is the strongest version of coercive diplomacy, it doesn't always become effective strategy. It may be highly risky and inappropriate to carry out in certain conditions.

The second one is tacit ultimatum. This strategy contains clear demand but as for sense of urgency and threat of punishment, although coercer set forth this element in public, these two elements can be clearly delivered to the target states and credible sensed. In terms of intensity of threat perception and sense of urgency, tacit ultimatum does not necessarily mean that it is far weaker than full-fledged ultimatum. This can be employed by combination of military preparation and stern warnings.

The third one is try and see approach. In this strategy, only a clear demand is conveyed, whereas the coercer does not proclaim strong sense of urgency nor threat to punishment. It waits to see whether a target state comply with demand or not. And if

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<sup>52</sup> George, *Coercive Diplomacy*, 72.



opponent does not comply then coercer will consider threatening adversary or take another measure.

The last one is gradual turning of the screw. It is similar with try and see approach except that a state using this strategy will threaten to step up pressure initially and gradually increase pressure exerted on the target states. It differs from ultimatum in that this strategy does not have sense of urgency and it will not rely on threat to punish harshly such as by using massive number of force to threaten adversary, rather they will gradually increase the pressure on it. The variants of strategies of coercive diplomacy can be summarized as below.

**Table 1. Variants of Coercive Diplomacy<sup>53</sup>**

<b>Strategy</b>	<b>Demand</b>	<b>Timeline</b>	<b>Punishment</b>
<b>Ultimatum</b>	Clear	Clear	Clear
<b>Tacit Ultimatum</b>	Clear	Not clear but urgent	Not clear but serious actions
<b>Gradual Turning of the Screw</b>	Clear	Not clear	Gradual increase
<b>Try and See</b>	Clear	Not clear	Not clear

Alexander also placed great importance on two levels of communications – words and actions. Significant non-verbal communication can happen by moving military forces or doing political and diplomatic activities. It can also take place from

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<sup>53</sup> Seong-Ho Sheen, North Korea's Nuclear and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Young Sun Ha, North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Peace on the Korean Peninsula (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2006), 43-68.

the structures and development of the situations. Thus, signaling or message to the adversary can be delivered nonverbally. Action may reinforce words, but it is generally hard to achieve the level of strong words delivered to the adversary. In order not to be dismissed as a bluff, both action and words need to be taken very seriously. And these two levels of communication are essential in carrying out coercive diplomacy.<sup>54</sup> The chances of miscommunication, misperceptions and miscalculations among states are highly likely, which is further lowering the possibility of success for coercive diplomacy.

Using the fourth component of coercive diplomacy is also very important, which is using of positive inducements and assurances as well as punitive threats to influence adversary. This approach is called carrot and stick approach. This strategy may enhance flexibility and adaptability and very useful in negotiation and bargain with the adversary. However, positive inducements and reassurances offered must be credible as much as the threat of punishment.

Alexander concluded by listing three critical points. First, he pointed out that the two central tasks for success are 1) what one demands of the opponent and 2) how strongly disinclined he is to comply with the demand. The latter task is highly dependent on the former task. Namely, the less coercer demand of the target state, the higher chances of success will be. Second one is that it is more likely to be successful if coercer's demand of the target states reflects the most important of coercer's interest, which is referred to as asymmetry of interests or motivation. The last one is that the

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<sup>54</sup> George, *Coercive Diplomacy*, 73-74.

target state's expectation of threat credibility is much more critical than that of coercer's.

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Overall, Alexander's theory of coercive diplomacy provides fundamental basis for analyzing US' foreign policy toward North Korea. However, the limitation of this theory is that it is based on state-level analysis. It does not take into account of other dimensions such as individuals and international system. Also, some of his concepts may appear to be vague or blurry so that it is hard to apply those concepts and compare, thereby to produce in-depth analysis. But this limitation can be reinforced to some extent by applying Jentleson's analytical framework in the following section.

## **2. Analytical Framework: Bruce W. Jentleson's Framework**

In Bruce W. Jentleson's article, he analyzed US coercive diplomacy toward Libya based on the theory of Coercive Diplomacy and effectively examined the key factors to the success of US coercive diplomacy strategy against Libya by applying concept of coercive diplomacy into his analytical Framework.

Jentleson's analytical framework consists of two sets of variables, one focusing on coercer state's strategy and another on target state's counterstrategy. The success of

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 75-76.

coercive diplomacy depends on whether three elements of coercer state strategy – proportionality, reciprocity and coercive credibility – combined with carrot and stick approach are well-balanced and on whether three criteria of target state’s counterstrategy – domestic politics, domestic economy and role of elites.<sup>56</sup>

## **2-1. Coercer State Strategy**

The success of coercive diplomacy hinges on whether costs of noncompliance and benefits of compliance for the target state are higher than countervailing costs of compliance and benefits of noncompliance. And this inequation can be further become favorable to the coercer state’s side when three criteria of coercer strategy of proportionality, reciprocity and coercive credibility are well balanced.

The first criterion is proportionality. This is “the relationship between the scope and nature of the objectives being pursued and the leverage being applied in their pursuit.” The cost of the target state’s compliance will be higher if the coercer state demand more of the opponent. And the costs of noncompliance and benefits of noncompliance will be higher accordingly. However, the actual use of force should be limited according to the concept of coercive diplomacy. If it goes beyond the use of threatened force, then coercive diplomacy fails in this case no matter the state achieved its goals. Therefore, coercive diplomacy is far from full-scale war. If the coercer state pursue regime change

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<sup>56</sup> Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, "Who “Won” Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy," review of *International Security* 30, no. 3 (2006): 47-86.

rather than policy change, then it is likely to be disproportional since means are limited to achieve prescribed goals. According to George and Simons, they categorized three types of coercive diplomacy depending on the extent to demand of the opponent. Type A of coercive diplomacy is persuading the target state to stop short of the goal. Type B is making the target state to undo the action. Lastly, Type C is dissuading the state by demanding for significant changes in composition of their system. (i.e. regime change) Comparing those three types above, Type C is the most difficult to achieve, followed by Type B and Type A being the easiest one among them. Jentleson thus argued that proportionality threshold is placed between policy change and regime change.

**Table 2. Three Types of Coercive Diplomacy**

<b>Type A</b>	<b>Type B</b>	<b>Type C</b>
Stop short of the Goal (i.e. Freeze, Moratorium)	Undo the action (i.e. Dismantlement)	Demand for a regime change (i.e. Democratization)

The second criterion is reciprocity. “It involves an explicit or at least mutually tacit understanding of linkage between the coercer’s carrots and the target’s concessions.” And this linkage may be incremental, but if the target state perceive that benefits can be achieved without having to reciprocate, then it may not be incremental. It is neither offering too little too late or for too much in return and neither is the case for offering too much too soon or for too little in return as well.<sup>57</sup> Thus the level of coercer’s carrots

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 51.

and target's concession should be well maintained.

The third criterion is coercive credibility. This element depends on whether the coercer state convincingly delivers the message of noncompliance will have negative repercussion. Coercive measures such as use of threatened force or actual use of force should be credible enough to make the target state to perceive increased costs for noncompliance. In the meantime, preponderance in military or economic power is not enough. US has been coercer state in all cases in the past, but the chance of success for US coercive diplomacy is below a half.

Jentleson further pointed out that supportive international actors and domestic politics will enhance the chances of success. Well-tuned coercer states' strategy, which meet all those criteria above, is not enough to persuade the opponent. The cases in the past are demonstrating that the international and domestic environment favorable to coercer state's strategy was a factor for successful coercive diplomacy.<sup>58</sup>

## **2-2. Target State Counterstrategy**

The second set of variables are target state's domestic politics, domestic economy and its role of elites. Given assumptions is that regardless of the target state's political system (i.e. democracy, authoritarian regime), maintaining the regime is its leader's foremost priority. Through regime type can be element to consider, but it does

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 53.

not determine the capability of target state's counter coercion.<sup>59</sup>

The first criterion is domestic politics. It depends on whether domestic political support and regime security are better served by noncompliance or domestic political gains can be acquired by complying with coercer state's demand. Pressure from the coercer state may enhance regime solidarity and domestic legitimacy as Galtung termed 'politically integrative effect.' In the meantime, when there is common interest between coercer and target state, improving relations with coercer state would be expected to bring positive influence on the target state. Political support for the regime is also important. The stronger support they have, the benefits of noncompliance will be higher and the opposite is the case for weak political support.

The second criterion is domestic economy. This is an economic calculation between costs that coercive measures such as military, economic and diplomatic sanctions may bring against target state for noncompliance and economic benefits from trade and other incentives from the coercer state in case for target's compliance. This element is influenced by flexibility and strength of the target state's domestic economy and its capability to bear economic costs imposed by the coercer state.

The third criterion under target state variables is the role of elites and other key domestic political and societal actors. It is nearly impossible for leaders to utterly disentangle themselves from those domestic elites from government and its society.


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<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 54.

Those elites can act as either ‘circuit-breakers’ by cutting off pressures from the coercer state or ‘transmission-belt’ by delivering coercer’s pressure directly on their regime depending on whether and how much Coercer’s demand serves better for those elites or threatens their interests.

Three factors can change over time along with other domestic factors which can exert influence on the regime. In addition to those three factors, Jentleson pointed out that other international factors such as global oil markets and geopolitics can also have a great influence. So, he said these factors should be considered while maintaining three factors as the fundamental variables. Summing up the elements of Jentleson’s analytical framework suggested in his article, Figure 2 is listed as below.

**Figure 2. Bruce W. Jentleson’s Analytical Framework**





Using Bruce Jentleson's analytical framework above as the basis, this research attempt to assess how United States effectively combines credible force and deft diplomacy consistent with proportionality, reciprocity and coercive credibility, taking international factors and restraints of domestic politics into account against North Korea. And at the same time, this thesis will further explore on how much North Korea's domestic politics and economy along with roles its elites affected whether regime leadership's self-perpetuation is better served by cooperation or confrontation.

### **2-3. Jentleson's Libyan case**

The brief summary of Jentleson's application of his analytical framework into Libyan case is as follows. He divided the period of US-Libya negotiation of nuclear program into three phases. Phase one - (US Sanctions and military Force, 1981-88), Phase Two - (Multilateral and sanctions based, 1989-98), and Phase Three - (Direct negotiations, 1999-2003). He argued that Phase I was failure since the Regan's coercive diplomacy lacked balance and Libya's domestic politics and economy's vulnerabilities were limited. And Phase II was mixed results of some Libyan moderation but still limited progress on the Pan-Am case and continued pursuit of WMD, with both variables of proportionality and coercive threat enhanced but lack of reciprocity. Finally Phase III was the major coercive diplomacy success by achieving balance in all three variables for the coercer state strategy. And there was growing conduciveness of Libyan domestic political and economic conditions to coercive diplomacy. Libya acted out of its self-interests and the prevailing sense in Libyan government was that rapprochement with

the US was necessary to secure its interests in the international society. Lastly, the group of transmission belts were stronger than circuit breakers groups, bringing external pressure on its regime.<sup>60</sup> The following table shows the summary of the result of US coercive diplomacy against Libya in each phase.

**Table 3. Evaluation on US Coercive Diplomacy toward Libya, 1981-2003**

	Coercer State(US) Strategy			Target State(Libya) Counterstrategy			Evaluation
	Proportionality	Reciprocity	Coercive Credibility	Domestic Politics	Domestic Economy	Role of Elites	
<b>Phase I (1981-88)</b>	X	X	O	X	X	X	Failure
<b>Phase II (1989-1998)</b>	O	X	O	Δ	Δ	Δ	Failure but limited Success
<b>Phase III (1999-2003)</b>	O	O	O	O	O	O	Success

## 2-4. Revised Jentleson's Analytical Model of this Study

In the meantime, while applying Jentleson's analytical framework would be expected to bring important lesson as well, but considering North Korea's unique political system and its self-reliant economy, these factors contributed to enable them to insulate themselves from external pressure. So, it was hard to find any significant changes in these variables in researching on North Korea's domestic politics and economy. Therefore, rather than designating them as independent variable, they are

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 55.

regarded as constants in this revised analytical framework. However, these factors are still considered to have contributed to the outcome of Bush's policy toward North Korea. Thus, the strategy of North Korea's domestic economy and politics as well as role of elites will be further explored before moving on to case study section of this research.

Also, international support and limited domestic opposition are regarded as intervening variables, as Jentleson applied in his Libyan case. Target's compliance of coercer demand will be my dependent variable. However, in order to avoid confusion of meanings and subjects of that 'compliance', this compliance is defined as 'following and carrying out agreements' in this study. Therefore, the main focus of this research will be how much Bush administration's coercive diplomacy strategy has influenced in either success or failure to North Korea's fulfillment of Agreements. (Agreed Framework in 1994, September 19<sup>th</sup> Agreement of 2005, February 13<sup>th</sup> Agreement of 2007, and October 3<sup>rd</sup> Agreement of 2007)

Below table is suggested revised Jentleson's analytical framework in analyzing Bush Administration's Coercive Diplomacy Strategy toward North Korea.


**Table 4. Revised Jentleson's Analytical Framework**

<u><i>Independent Variables</i></u>	<u><i>Intervening Variables</i></u>	<u><i>Dependent Variable</i></u>
<b>Proportionality</b>	<b>International Support</b>  <b>Limited Domestic opposition</b>	<b>Target's Compliance of Coercer's Demand</b>
<b>Reciprocity</b>		
<b>Coercive Credibility</b>		

### 3. Research Design

#### 3-1. Scope & Purpose

**Figure 3. Major Events regarding North Korea's Nuclear Issue, 1993 - 2017**



The scope of this research will be confined to George W. Bush administration's period of 2001-2009. To define precisely, the scope of focus is from when Bush started administration on his inauguration day of January 10th, 2001 to the moment when he left and handed over to Barack Obama for the White House on January 10th, 2009. While not completely excluding the events regarding US policy toward North Korea during the other presidents' period, the main focus will be the son Bush's administration.

In applying those analytical frameworks, this thesis divided the presidential term for Bush administration (2001-2009) into three periods. Rather than simply dividing into the first and the second term of Bush administration, the case study section of this research is divided into Phase one (January 2001 - October 2006), Phase two (November 2006 – October 2007) and Phase three (November 2007 – January 2009). As raised questions above, the first nuclear test was the watershed event for Bush administration to change its policy toward North Korea. And there was clear distinctive

division of policy lines pursued in each period. While the period one consists of hardline policy, period two is comprised of accommodative policy as suggested in Table 2 below. Thus, each period for Bush administration will be further discussed with the concept of theory and the analytical framework suggested above. At first, each period will be analyzed with the concept of coercive diplomacy based on facts, then those factors will be evaluated by the revised Jentleson's analytical framework.

**Table 5. Examples of US' Hardline and Softline Policy toward North Korea**

Examples of Confrontational policy ('01 ~ '06)	Examples of Accommodative policy ('07 ~ '09)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN Security Council Resolution 1695/1718</li> <li>• President's executive order 13382</li> <li>• Six-party talks but denied bilateral talk</li> <li>• Initiation of Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI)</li> <li>• US' North Korean humanitarian act of 2004</li> <li>• Freeze of NK account in BDA</li> <li>• Official remark: 'Axis of evil', 'Outpost of tyranny', 'Pygmy', 'Spoiled Child'</li> <li>• Hidden assumptions: NK's regime change</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bilateral Talk with North Korea</li> <li>• US concessions on Feb 13th Deal in 2007</li> <li>• US concessions on Oct 13th Deal in 2007</li> <li>• Bilateral negotiations in Singapore in 2008</li> <li>• Unfreeze of NK's BDA account</li> <li>• Removal from the Sponsor list of Terrorism</li> <li>• Removal from Trade with Enemy Act</li> <li>• Official remark: "Mr. Kim"</li> <li>• Hidden assumptions: NK's policy change</li> </ul>

The purpose of this research is in analyzing Bush administration's policy toward North Korea with relevant international theories and drawing some lessons for the current administration for both US and South Korea. In the meantime, Bush and Trump share many common elements in that both are represented by conservative and hardline republicans, who do not have prior experience in US foreign policy. Also, each president was and is having its ally's presidents who are from the progressive political party. This commonalities of these two presidents and situation in South Korea would contribute to well-constructed research so that this can be referred for policymakers or students who are interested in areas such as solution to North Korea's nuclear issues and so forth.

### **3-2. Research Methodology**

This research would fall under the category of case-study method. Focusing cases of Bush administration policy toward North Korea, this thesis aims to analyze factors of challenges and failure for US to denuclearize North Korea in depth. Most of the data materials came from official statements and remarks of the US President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, official statements on major agreement in the six party talks, official documents such as NSS and QDR and relevant academic researches on Bush administration's policy toward North Korea. Also, writings or memoirs from those Bush administration's high officials in charge of North Korean issue were consulted. While excluding analysis from media source on Bush's North Korean policy, this research refers to news articles which provides objective historical facts or data. Policy papers from Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, Center for

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Research and Development Corporation (RAND) are also main sources of this thesis.

### **3-3. Hypotheses**

In the literature review section, this thesis reviewed existing materials regarding Bush administration's policy toward North Korea. As this thesis made categorization of five groups for existing literatures, there were ample number of researches regarding these subjects. However, there were lack of explanations on failure or possible success factors for US' North Korean policy during the Bush administration within the well-organized framework as well as on theory which relevantly characterized the essence of Bush's foreign policy, which could not answer to research questions in this thesis. Therefore, based on the concept of coercive diplomacy theory by Alexander and analytical framework by Jentleson written above, these tools would hopefully contribute to find answers to the questions of fundamental problems and challenges to Bush administration's policy toward North Korea. In the meantime, Jentleson's analytical framework successfully drew success and failure factors for US coercive diplomacy strategy against Libyan nuclear issues, which is highly relevant with ongoing North Korean nuclear issues. Therefore, rather than designing new concepts and framework, this research adopted his framework except that a set of variables for the target state, North Korea, are designated as constants in this analysis.

A set of variables for US' coercer state strategy were proportionality, reciprocity and coercive credibility, which are regarded as independent variables in this analysis.

And these independent variables are influenced by intervening factors such as international cooperation and domestic opposition. And this research attempt to find out how much these variables played in persuading North Korea to comply with US' demand, of which assume fulfillment of existing agreements as prominent indicators. So, this thesis came up with four hypotheses for the US coercive diplomacy during the Bush Administration in affecting North Korea's compliances with US demands or the change of its behavior as followings.

H1: The Bush administration's persuasion with North Korea to meet with US' demand of denuclearization failed when the means and ends of US objective on North Korea were highly disproportional. (Proportionality Variable)

H2: The Bush administration's policy toward North Korea failed to change North Korea's noncompliant behavior since there was a weak linkage between US' incentives and North Korea's concessions for North Korea's compliance. (Reciprocity Variable)

H3: The Bush administration's coercive diplomacy toward North Korea hinges on whether US' threat for punishment for North Korea are credible enough to change NK's action of noncompliance or not. (Coercive Credibility Variable)

H4: The US Coercive Diplomacy Strategy will not succeed when there is lack of international cooperation and domestic support even when there is balanced coercer strategy. (International & Domestic Support)



### **3-4. Limitation of this Research**

First of all, since there is significant lack of North Korea information due to its closed-door nature of political system, the fundamental drawbacks of this research may be incorrect North Korea's data. So, I will rely on data analyzing North Korea's economy and political system from official documents or policy report from well-known institutions or those prominent scholar's academic papers.

Second, the focus of this research is Bush administration's policy toward North Korea during his entire two terms. So, this research would be the most desirable to have an interview with all US high officials, including president himself, but it is impossible to do so. Therefore, any intention or perception of the US government toward North Korea was based on second-hand materials such as policy papers, academic papers and official documents for similar reasons with North Korea above.

Third, this research is primarily based on a state-level analysis. So, other levels of analysis were rarely discussed and further analyzed in detail due to prominent features of Alexander's theory or Jentleson's framework.

Lastly, international factors such as bilateral relations of other participants in the six-party talks with US or North Korea respectively (i.e US-China relations, DPRK-China relations, Inter-Korean relations) were not deeply engaged out of concern that these factors would complicate the analysis. But this does not exclude the assumption that these bilateral relations factors would have significant impact on North Korean issue.

### **III. CHALLENGES OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY TOWARD NORTH KOREA**

#### **1. Challenges to Military Coercion**

Prior to analysis on Bush administration's policy toward North Korea, this section will examine the infeasibility of relying on military options as US' main strategy toward North Korea, which has been constantly defying and not complying with US demand.

##### **1-1. The Military Options Unexecuted**

Going back to the first North Korea nuclear crisis during the Clinton administration, which was explained in the introduction part, president Clinton himself and his staffs seriously considered military air strike against Yongbyon nuclear facilities at the risk of all-out war. However, the problem was that "surgical" strike to eliminate North Korean nuclear facilities was considered unlikely to be successful, given North Korea's tactics of hiding its weapon system underground tunnels and lack of information of the additional nuclear facilities. And challenges to the invasion of the North Korea was that the estimate of casualties totaled 52,000 US soldiers and nearly 500,000 Korean soldiers with untold number of civilian casualties. Since the risk of North Korea's retaliatory action in case of carrying military options were so high that Clinton decided to solve the problem diplomatically.

During Bush Administration period, there were two possible occasions that US could consider military options against North Korea, which is during amidst the second nuclear crisis (2002-2003) and in the year of 2006 when North Korea launched series of long-range missiles and provocative nuclear test. In 2002, the US published two official documents regarding this issue. In January 2002, the Department of Defense announced the overview of its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2002. In NPR 2002, US had contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against the Axis of Evil states, which are North Korea, Iran and Iraq along with Russia, China, Libya and Syria.<sup>61</sup> In September, US published National Security Strategy (NSS) 2002. In NSS 2002, US stated that it will use forces to strike preemptively against those countries which harbor terrorist with WMD.<sup>62</sup>

“There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense. The United States will not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging threats. Our preference is that nonmilitary actions succeed. And no country should ever use preemption as a pretext for aggression.”<sup>63</sup>

Furthermore, Bush addressed at the United States Military Academy on June 1,

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<sup>61</sup> Philipp C. Bleek, "Nuclear Posture Review Leaks; Outlines Targets, Contingencies," Arms Control Association, [https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002\\_04/nprapril02](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_04/nprapril02) (Accessed September 6, 2017).

<sup>62</sup> US Department of State, "National Security Strategy of the United States of the America – September 2002," <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf> (Accessed January 1, 2018).

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

2002 that preemptive war would play in the future of American foreign policy and national defense.<sup>64</sup> Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned against North Korea that US could maintain two war fronts at the same time during the second North Korean nuclear crisis. As such, the US brought in the possibility to take proactive military options against North Korea in various official remarks and documents.<sup>65</sup> But in neither could find any direct military actions against North Korea both in 2002 and in 2006.

## **1-2. Invasion of Iraq, then Why Not North Korea?**

Although US named Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as Axis of evil as threatening the security to its security, US invaded only Iraq. The Table 6 of comparison of forces capabilities among three countries are showing that North Korea had the strongest military and much developed and sophisticated WMDs. Then why didn't they invade North Korea with threatening strong capabilities?

Jaechun argued that military capabilities of North Korea and Iran effectively deterred US military action. Also, circumstance was not favorable for US to attack first. North Korea has China behind their back, which they still maintain legal basis as an alliance. China would have opposed vehemently, Iraq was an ideal target because of US wanted to safeguard oil interest in the middle east. US wanted to preserve status as

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<sup>64</sup> The.White.House, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point," <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html> (Accessed January 1, 2018).

<sup>65</sup> The.Associated.Press, "Rumsfeld Warns N. Korea: Us Can Fight Two Wars," <http://www.foxnews.com/story/2002/12/24/rumsfeld-warns-n-korea-us-can-fight-two-wars.html> (Accessed November 21, 2017).

paramount world power. Bush's foreign policy was aimed at maintaining US supremacy with the use of unilateralism and preemption. Invading North Korea was too risky for US to maintain its status as a hegemon.<sup>66</sup>

**Table 6. Comparison of Military and WMD Capabilities among Axis of Evil States<sup>67</sup>**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Iraq</b>	<b>Iran</b>	<b>North Korea</b>
<b>Active troops</b>	424,000	513,000	1,082,000
<b>Active main battle tanks</b>	1,900	1,565	3,500
<b>Self-propelled artillery</b>	150	310	4,400
<b>Combat aircraft</b>	316	283	621
<b>Submarines</b>	0	3	26
<b>Short-range missiles</b>	25 Scud	~200 Scud B. Sud C	500+ Scud B, Scud C
<b>Medium-range missile</b>	0	Shahab 3 (1,200km), limited numbers potentially deployed, tested three times	50-100 No Dong (1,300km)
<b>Long-range (intercontinental) missiles</b>	0	0	3-stage Taepo-Dong tested 1998; 2-stage Taepo-Dong 2 untested
<b>Nuclear program</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Chemical weapons</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Biological weapons</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Fissile nuclear material</b>	Non-confirmed	None confirmed	~2 bombs worth plus ~5 bombs worth of PU from fuel rods once reprocessed and HEU project

<sup>66</sup> Kim and Hundt, "Us Policy toward Rogue States: Comparing the Bush Administration's Policy toward Iraq and North Korea," 252.

<sup>67</sup> Howard, "Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy," 807.

Peter argued that instead of relying on realist account of taking material threat into account, he rather proposed constructivist's approach which focuses on language to explain the difference in US foreign policy. He argued that "Bush administration was entangled in preexisting language game of engagement, whereas they had been delaminated by language of force against Iraq." So, the US didn't deal with North Korea based on the idea of hawkish engagement. Despite the prevailing capability of US forces, US officials were extremely concerned with cost of such war. One of the deadliest cost would be collateral damage of North Korean artillery attack into metropolitan Seoul. Also, Japan is within North Korea's missile capability and US Forces stationed there would be also affected. If war occurs in Korea, there will be significant number of casualties not only for North Korea but also South Korea, Japan and US as well. These calculation and perception was taken into account of language game. Thus, he concluded that nuclear program as a manageable threat which can be solved diplomatically.<sup>68</sup>

### **1-3. The Challenges to Implementation of Military**

#### **Options against North Korea**

According Daniel Byman, he listed the means of coercion as followings – air strike, land invasion, threat of retaliatory nuclear attack, economic sanctions, political isolation, support to rebel forces.<sup>69</sup> Among those means, air strike and land invasion

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 822-826.

<sup>69</sup> Byman, *The Dynamics of Coercion : American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* / Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman, 87.

would fall under the category of the military options. As for air strike, US has been employing this options against those who posed as great security threat to US security such as contemplating terror attack. Elliot Cohen argued that Air Force is very attractive form of military force, since it appears to give satisfaction to policy makers without significant restraint. While the minimizing the level of cost of intervening in target state, air strike may enable a coercer state to achieve its goal against the target state. Whereas invasion by land forces would be the one of the most definite way to acquire concession from the target state but the risks and costs incurred from choosing this option is tremendously high that it's hard to implement.<sup>70</sup>

In a CRS report published in July 2003 in the midst of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, the author explained the challenges to the military options such as 80% of the peninsula covered by rugged hills and mountains and harsh weather conditions of extremely freezing winter and high temperature and humidity in summer with cyclic heavy rains and deluge. North Korean Army have forward deployed 70% of their forces to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and have built systemized underground tunnel and caves for protection. And densely populated Seoul about 25 miles close to the DMZ is complicating military planning, since North Korea's surprise artillery attack will cause lots of casualties. Considering North Korea's past behavior of unpredictable and violations to the provocation, modest US action against North Korea could be escalated into high levels of conflicts. Also, it would be immoral to carry out military options

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<sup>70</sup> Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," review of Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (1994): 109-124.

without prior consultation with South Korea.<sup>71</sup>

This report presented five military options that US could choose as followings.<sup>72</sup>

- 1) Status Quo is to keep current situation with stable military force while diplomacy is the main tools for the solution.
- 2) Improve Defensive Posture is temporary measure of deploying various assets around the Korean peninsula such as intelligence, reserve forces.
- 3) Military Enforcement of Sanctions is interception effort on the high seas or air by military force. Difficulty of this this option is such as unlikely cooperation of China and Russia, requirement of deploying additional navy and air force assets
- 4) Preemptive strike on North Korean nuclear facilities is challenging because of North Korea's well protected underground target, inaccuracy of target location and risk of retaliatory attack escalating into war.
- 5) Preemptive War should meet two precondition of US priority for North Korea's regime change and imminent major North Korean attack. It's unlikely option because of factors such as lack of international support, difficulty of covert war preparation, heavy commitment in Iraq, unlikely acceptance of domestic politics, and bitter experience of Chinese intervention in Korean War.

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<sup>71</sup> Edward F. Bruner, "North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options," (Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, 2003), RS21582, 1-3.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 3-6.



#### **1-4. Coercive Diplomacy as an Attractive Alternative.**

Military options indeed entail lots of costs and risks. We reviewed military options above and how challenging it is to implement them. Therefore, relying on this offensive compliance or actual use of violence against North Korea is not a desirable strategy. At the same time, relying purely on appeasement to induce North Korea to change by providing incentives would not be acceptable among policy makers in US as well. North Korea has shown aggressive and non-compliant attitude despite international strong pressure throughout the nuclear crisis. Therefore, the idea of dealing with them through diplomatic instrument with threat of punishment by use of force, economic sanction and so forth would be the best course of action to deal with North Korean nuclear issue. In the following section, analysis on North Korean counterstrategy during 2001-2009 with a revised Jentleson's Analytical Framework will be discussed.

## **2. North Korea's Counterstrategy during January**

### **2001 – January 2009**

North Korea has been sustaining its regime despite its constant provocative development of nuclear weapons during Bush's administration's period of 2001-2009. In a way, North Korea achieved goal of advancing toward the nuclear state by developing and acquiring several nuclear warheads, whereas Bush administration could not see the

realization of complete North Korea's disablement process of its nuclear program at the end of his term. Before analyzing Bush administration's strategy toward North Korea, it's necessary to figure out how three variables for the target state, which is North Korea, enabled them to survive through US and regional party's pressure on denuclearization without bringing in any significant domestic crisis or drawbacks for the regime itself. Due to North Korea's unique characteristics of its politics and economy, this section will briefly go over background of each variable for North Korea, and then further focus on what was the relevant features during this period.

## **2.1. Domestic Politics**

The political system of North Korea is governed by centralized Suryong system, which refers to its Supreme Leader. This system consists of leadership and integration. The former means that system places Suryong-the party-the state in order and the latter refers to that all three elements of Suryong, the party and state are integrated so its people are voluntarily supporting Suryong.<sup>73</sup> Also, North Korea pursued self-sufficiency and isolation policy from the world outside, which is called *juche* or self-reliance. This philosophy has been used since 1950s to empower their supreme leader Kim Family (both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jung-il) as the supernatural ones.<sup>74</sup>

While Kim Il-sung equally emphasized political independence, self-defense, and

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<sup>73</sup> Hyeongjung Park, *Political System of North Korea during Kim Jong-Il's era* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2004), 1-30.

<sup>74</sup> Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, "North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis," (Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, 2010), RL32493, 26-27.

self-reliant economy, Kim Jung-il emphasized military as the most important element among them. And this military-first policy placed military ahead of worker's party. He insisted that a country can have strong ideology and economy if its military is strong. Ever since this military-first policy has been implemented in 1998, and the center of gravity moved to military from Worker's Party accordingly. Also, Kim Jung-il held a tight grip on his elites. In January 2001, he emphasized that "loyalty is not a word but an ability."<sup>75</sup> It is widely known that Kim Jung-il rewards with luxury items such as automobiles for those elites who show constant allegiance to him.

In the meantime, it was known that Kim Jung-il apparently suffered from a stroke in August 2008. He had reportedly been suffering from several illnesses including such as diabetes, kidney and heart problems since 2000.<sup>76</sup> Lots of uncertainties were going around over his health and his control over his regimes from late 2008 to 2009 throughout. Despite many experts' worries of the regime instability, North Korea showed no signs of such elements. Rather Kim's stroke led to bring more military generals into those important position in the party, constituting much more aggressive policy.

Therefore, even though North Korea has been exerted strong pressures and further isolated from international community for its constant provocations such as launching long-range missiles and testing a nuclear weapon, the characteristics of North Korea's domestic politics enabled them to survive through it. Above all, ever since

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<sup>75</sup> Park, *Political System of North Korea during Kim Jong-Il's era*, 112-118.

<sup>76</sup> Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, "North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis," 6-10.

military leaders gained the initiatives inside the power structure of North Korea due to Kim Jung il's preference for 'First Military Policy', it became more evident that North Korea's politics was best served by defiance with the US, enhancing the politically integrative effects to its people rather than cooperating with them, considering the fact that the military factions are characterized by their aggressive and belligerent inclinations against the US.<sup>77</sup> In addition, Kim Jung-il's firm grip on his leadership among his elites and people was also contributing to North Korea's defiant behavior against the United States. And this element of domestic politics hasn't changed until the end of Bush Administration's second term.

## **2-2. Domestic Economy**

The economy of North Korea is the basis for its nuclear programs. Depending on the condition of North Korea's economy, North Korea will calculate whether it serves better by cooperation or confrontation. Even North Korea's pursue of isolationist economy policy couldn't make it without conforming to contemporary world of globalization. After fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea's economy underwent significant downturn. Once being used to get benefits and incentives from neighboring communist countries, North Korea at that time no longer enjoyed it. North Korea had to weather through economic hardship in 1990s, in which they call 'arduous march'.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Seung-Yeol Lee, "Political Transition in North Korea in the Kim Jong-Un Era: Elites' Policy Choices.(North Korean Politics)(Report)," review of Asian Perspective 41, no. 3 (2017): 431.

<sup>78</sup> Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, "North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis," 22.

More than two million North Korean starved to death while relying on food aid and economic assistance from other countries.<sup>79</sup> Indeed, the scarcity of food was severe during this period. Some reports analyzed that the famine in the 1990s were caused by inefficiency of North Korea's Central Planned Economy, characterized by promotion of state-owned industry with high level of military spending compared to its GDP and its political system.<sup>80</sup>

Thus, North Korea enforced the July 1<sup>st</sup> Measures in 2002 to pursue a mixed system of planned economy and market economy.<sup>81</sup> North Korea preferred this measure to be called as economic adjustment policy rather than reform, because they didn't abandon the socialist planned economy but they had to adjust some portion of it. This system entails the introduction of domestic market, ending the rationing system for daily commodities, huge increase in price for essentials and wage, devaluation of currency, increasing autonomy of company, limited opening of the economy to foreign investment.<sup>82</sup> In 2006, there were many indications that showed thriving markets with all kinds of products and various needs of shoppers.<sup>83</sup> As such, this reform was gradually transformative in nature.

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 21.


<sup>80</sup> Raghav Gaiha, *Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform* by Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, vol. 39 (Oxford, UK: Columbia University Press, 2008), 3.

<sup>81</sup> Lee, "Political Transition in North Korea in the Kim Jong-Un Era: Elites' Policy Choices.(North Korean Politics)(Report)," 438.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 438-439.

<sup>83</sup> Charles Pritchard, L. Siegfried S. Hecker, and Robert Carlin, "News Conference: Update from Pyongyang, Sponsored by the Korea Economic Institute" (paper presented at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, November 15 2006).

**Figure 4. Estimated Real Annual Growth in North Korea's GDP, 1986-2011<sup>84</sup>**



Source: Congressional Research Service with data from Global Insight (based on Bank of Korea data).

However, as North Koreans were accustomed to this new type of economic system in 2007, this reform raised fears among North Korea's elites that this might bring in capitalism in to their original socialist economy. In August 2007, Kim Jung-il announced that the expansion of markets has become antisocialist western-style markets, characterized by materialism, individualism and anticollectivism, which was penetrating North Korea's society.<sup>85</sup> After this, the authorities implemented ban on certain imported

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>85</sup> Munsu Yang, *Marketization in North Korean Economy* (Paju: Hanwool, 2010), 124-128.

items and restrictions on Women under certain age.<sup>86</sup>

Figure 4 is showing estimated real annual growth in North Korea's GDP from 1986 to 2011, published by a CRS report. While taking into account the fact that there are discrepancies in relevant data due to limited access to actual North Korea's economic performance, it's possible to take a view of North Korea's economic condition during this period. This figure shows that North Korea's GDP growth was negative during most of the 1990s and started to recover in 1999. While the consecutive year of 2006-2007 was in decline, it soon recovered from 2008. But we need to note that North Korea's GNP in 2008 in purchasing power parity prices (PPP) were estimated at \$40 billion to \$54 billion.<sup>87</sup> This can be translated into \$1700 to \$2249 per capita in PPP values which was in similar level with Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan, or Sudan, compared to South Korea's \$26,000 in PPP values.<sup>88</sup>

It should be also noted that China's investment and trade with North Korea was helping the country to secure needed imports of energy, food, and machinery for factories. Its trade deficit has been financed primarily through foreign aid, investments, and remittances from overseas workers as well as various illicit activities according to a CRS report. North Korea's 60% its exports were bound to China and South Korea and 71% of imports from these two countries in 2007. Kaesong Industrial Complex has produced gradual number of productions during this period, contributing to North Korea's

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
<sup>86</sup> Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, "North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis," 25-26.

<sup>87</sup> World.Bank, "International Comparison Program, Preliminary Results," World Bank Study, 2007).

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

economy.<sup>89</sup>

**Figure 5. North Korea's Imports of Merchandise by Major Country of Source, 1996-2008**



**Source:** CRS with data from UN COMTRADE Database, Global Trade Atlas, and (South) Korea Unification Ministry.

Overall, despite North Korea's partial reform and economic cooperation from certain countries, it was still in dire need of developing its economy. This also pertains that there was no significant improvement for North Korea's economy, which would lead to their calculation of negotiation based on their interest in building up their economy.

<sup>89</sup> Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, "The North Korean Economy: Leverage and Policy Analysis," (Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, 2008), RL32493, 33.



### **2-3. Role of Elites**

In the first variable of domestic politics, this analysis found out that North Korea's political system is based on Suryong system. And this Suryong system is maintained by role of elites. There are two roles for the elites in North Korea. First one is playing as a gateway to carry out the commands of their Supreme Leader in the system. Second one is playing as the pivot that integrate supreme leader and his people into single existence in society.<sup>90</sup> And Kim Jong-il replaced role of party elites with military elites under the dictum of his military-first policy.

Competition between among elites accelerated from the period from mid-1998 to 2005. The major elite group was divided into reformers which consisted of military and cabinet elites and conservatives who are from party elites. Due to Kim Jung-il's preference for military first policy, the reformers outnumbered the conservatives. This was evident since many core positions were filled with military generals. Also since the implementation of July 1<sup>st</sup> measure in 2002, a policy of meritocracy was prominent.<sup>91</sup> However, conservatives blamed for reformer's marketization plan, explaining that reform measures are threatening the regime. So, the party conservatives started to regain

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<sup>90</sup> Lee, "Political Transition in North Korea in the Kim Jong-Un Era: Elites' Policy Choices.(North Korean Politics)(Report)," 431-432.

<sup>91</sup> Ju Hee Lee, "A Study on the Control of the Military since Kim Jung-Il Era - Focus on the Relationships between the Party and the Military in North Korea - " review of Social Science Research Review 30, no. 1 (2014): 1-19.

influence from late 2005, focusing on controlling on markets. Jang Sung Taek's regaining of his old position was one of evidences that showed conservative's retake. And the power structure was reduced to military and conservatives, since latter defeated cabinet's reform initiatives.<sup>92</sup>

Thus, there were two major elite groups competing each other during this period. Considering conservative's tendency to preserve its country against external pressure and military leader's aggressive inclination to abhor US influences, these elites short-circuited pressure from US or other countries rather than served as transmission belt to exert pressure on its North Korea's regime to comply with US demand.

**Table 7. North Korea's Counterstrategy against United States, 2001-2009**

	Domestic Politics	Domestic Economy	Role of Elites
January 2001 – January 2009	Under unique, centralized system under its dictator, defiance led to integration. *Kim Jung-il's Stroke('08)	Recovery but slow, closed economy. Reform halted Trade volume with China significantly improved	Conservative and Military group's prevailing led to overall short-circuiting.
Assessment (Influence to US Strategy)	X Unfavorable	△ Partly favorable	X Unfavorable

So far, this section has reviewed three variables that Jentleson applied in his Libya case. However, the North Korean case is showing that none of these three elements has shown any significant changes during the Bush administration's period of 2001-2009. Therefore, North Korea's conditions of domestic of economy and politics cannot be considered as variable. This is why these elements are designated as constants in this

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<sup>92</sup> Lee, "Political Transition in North Korea in the Kim Jong-Un Era: Elites' Policy Choices.(North Korean Politics)(Report)," 432.

analysis. Except that North Korea's domestic economy was partly favorable to the US coercive diplomacy strategy during this period since US held, to certain extent, economic and financial leverage against North Korea by exploiting its weaknesses, the other elements were generally unfavorable. While not denying the fact that this will not influence the outcome of US coercive diplomacy strategy toward North Korea during this period, the following case study chapter will mainly focus on the US side's coercer state strategy against North Korea.

## **IV. CASE STUDY: GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA**

### **1. Coercive Diplomacy during Phase I: January 2001 – October 2006**

#### **1-1. US Strategy during Phase One – ‘Tacit Ultimatum’**

President George W. Bush entered the oval office in January 2001 determined to pressure North Korea to give up nuclear weapons. In March 2001, South Korea's president Kim Dae-Jung visited the US in order to coordinate policy toward North Korea. A day before his visit, Secretary of State, Colin Powell mentioned that “the administration plans to engage with North Korea to pick up where President Clinton left off.” However, the new government officials' judgement was that his remark might send wrong signals as if the Agreed Framework were desirable in contents and this agreement should be alternated with verifiable new agreement. So, Powell had to amend his comment that it is not the right time for the negotiation in the following day.<sup>93</sup>

After three months, President Bush announced the outline of his

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<sup>93</sup> Christopher D O'Sullivan, Colin Powell: American Power and Intervention from Vietnam to Iraq (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 125-158.

administration's new North Korean policy through an official statement in June 2001. In the statement, it stated that 1) North Korea's nuclear activity should be applied with improved implementation of agreed framework of 1994, 2) a restriction on missile programs and a ban on its missile exports, and 3) a less threatening conventional military posture.<sup>94</sup> In other words, if North Korea comply with suggested US' demand, then US will give political and economic incentives to them. Therefore, it became clear that Bush administration placed preconditions for corresponding actions.

On September 11, 2001, as US suffered from ever unprecedented major terrorist attack supported by Al-Qaeda inside its territory, the US started to initiate "War on Terror." North Korea announced that they will oppose any international terrorism, showing their intention to join anti-terrorist regime. But the US responded to this by further requiring North Korea to demand more direct information on the terror. In January of following year, President Bush dubbed North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, as "Axis of Evil" in his State of the Union address. In response to Bush's remarks, North Korea criticized this and declared that they would deny any bilateral talk with the US. In fact, Bush wanted to end the negotiating strategy, which was pursued by both Clinton and Kim Dae-Jung administration.<sup>95</sup> In October 2002, the US dispatched James Kelly, the assistant Secretary of State, to North Korea, and he found out that there was a

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<sup>94</sup> The White House, "Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation. 01.6.13," <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html> (Accessed January 1, 2018).

<sup>95</sup> Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, *The Use of Force : Military Power and International Politics* / Edited by Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, 8th ed (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).

clandestine uranium enrichment program in North Korea which was admitted offhand by North Korean official, Kang, Seokju, though later he denied. This is the very beginning of the second nuclear crisis. Because of this break, the US cut off the oil shipment to North Korea and KEDO's activity was suspended a year later and South Korea and Japan halted their construction of LWRs, clearly implying the dissolution of Agreed Framework of 1994. In January 2003, North Korea announced that they would withdraw from the NPT and in the following month they expelled the IAEA inspectors and declared that they will restart the fuel rod reprocessing.<sup>96</sup> Next month, the IAEA adopted a resolution on safeguards in North Korea, criticizing North Korea's behavior and submitting to UNSC.

The US– DPRK relations further deteriorated when North Korea's four aircrafts were tailing US reconnaissance plane flying over the Korean peninsula for 22 minutes.<sup>97</sup> Following this incident, the US made a strong protest against North Korea and Bush insisted upon them to end its nuclear program in a Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible and Dismantlement (CVID) manner, with saying that "all options are on the table."<sup>98</sup> As these bilateral relations got strained, China finally played active role in serving as a mediator between the two. North Korea revealed its intention to participate in the talks only if the US did not show any confrontational policy toward them.

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<sup>96</sup> Perry, *My Journey at the Nuclear Brink* / William J. Perry, 160-171.

<sup>97</sup> Arms Control Association, "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Missile Diplomacy," 11-12.

<sup>98</sup> Sang Mok Suh, *The Korean Peninsula after Kim Jong-II: The Road to Globalization and Liberal Unification* (Seoul: Book Korea, 2004), 20-26.

Although the three party talk of US, China and North Korea in April 2003 were concluded without contents, this laid the ground for further six-party talks in the future. A CRS report published on Mar 17<sup>th</sup>, 2003 summarized the Bush's policy toward North Korea such as termination of Agreed Framework, no bilateral negotiation but multilateral talks to pressure and warning of future economic sanctions and possibly military options.<sup>99</sup>

As such, US wanted to pursue multilateral talks rather than bilateral talks since they had mistrust in North Korea's past behavior of cheating its commitment. The advantages of six party talks were that these settings were expected to bring major players into the negotiation table and make other parties, especially China and Russia, to face North Korea's obstinacy and exert pressure on them.<sup>100</sup> North Korea had to face more pressure from these countries, whereas it only faced the US in the past. China had presided over all six-party talks. They played an active role in mediating different views and positions among six countries.

The first through third round of the six party talks were held during the period of 2003-2004. During these talks, there was no fruitful outcome to solution for North Korea's denuclearization. The contents of negotiation were merely symbolic. But, each party felt the necessity to push ahead with these negotiation tables in the hope that talks

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<sup>99</sup> Larry A. Niksch, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program," (Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, 2003), IB91141, 2-5.

<sup>100</sup> Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, "North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation," (Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, 2013), R41259, 17.

would bring solutions. The Six parties shared the view of continuation of six-party talks and principles of peaceful resolution.<sup>101</sup>

However, ever since the third round of the six party talks ended in June 2004, these talks didn't take place for more than a year. In January 2005, the appointed Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, called North Korea as 'outpost of tyranny' and emphasized the need to spread democracy and freedom over the world in her confirmation hearing, implying indirect pressure on North Korea.<sup>102</sup>

In response to her remarks, North Korea declared that they possess nuclear weapons since the Bush government didn't abandon hostile policy against them in February. Also, North Korea announced that they successfully unloaded 8000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor, while they showed that they have no intention to return to the six-party talks.<sup>103</sup>

The selection of word depicting North Korea became more attenuated. Secretary Rice mentioned several times that the US recognized North Korea's sovereignty. President Bush used the word 'Mr. Kim' to depict their leader.<sup>104</sup> For resumption of the talks, China sent special envoys to persuade them to come back and North Korea replied that they would return if the conditions are met. And finally, the

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<sup>101</sup> Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy : The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb* / Charles L. Pritchard, 101-106.

<sup>102</sup> Daljung Jang, *Us-Dprk Confrontation : Cold War Confrontation within the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jeongcheol Lee and Suho Im, (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2011) 115-119.

<sup>103</sup> Arms Control Association, "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Missile Diplomacy," 9-10.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.



fourth round of the six party talks initiated.<sup>105</sup>

After having three periods of meetings for negotiations, all participants in the six party talks finally announced in the form of Joint Statement on 19<sup>th</sup> September, in 2005. In the statement all participants agreed to carry out verifiable denuclearization on the Korean peninsula peacefully and coordinate to implement obligations and rewards by phases based on the principle of ‘commitment for commitment and action for action’. North Korea also agreed to abolish nuclear and its existing program and return to multilateral regime such as NPT and IAEA. It called for Joint declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in 1992 and the US affirmed that they had no intention to attack or invade North Korea. Furthermore, North Korea requested the right “to use nuclear peacefully and receive the provision of LWR at an appropriate time.”<sup>106</sup>

However, there were discrepancies in interpreting the joint statement among participants. Especially regarding the phrase of “at an appropriate time”, North Korea demanded to provide them with LWRs for the abandonment of nuclear programs whereas US insisted that abandonment of nuclear programs should take place first to make it happen. So the US announced its separate independent statement which contained US’ interpretation on the Joint Statement during same day.<sup>107</sup> But, the September 19<sup>th</sup> Agreement of 2005 was meaningful work in that it was the first joint

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<sup>105</sup> Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy : The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb* / Charles L. Pritchard, 107-131.

<sup>106</sup> US Department of State, "Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks."

<sup>107</sup> Chinoy, *Meltdown : The inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* / Mike Chinoy, 241-251.

statement made and agreed by all participant in the six party talks. Also inducing North Korea to agree to abandon all its nuclear program was remarkable.

In the meantime, the implementation of this joint statement didn't make any progress as the US Treasury Department, in less than a few days from the joint statement, announced that North Korea was involved in counterfeiting US currency. US criticized that North Korea made 'Supernote', which counterfeited US 100 dollar, to illegally benefited themselves. US Treasury Department warned Banco Delta Asia (BDA) that it is being used by North Korea for its illegal money laundry.<sup>108</sup> In October, Treasury department announced sanctions against North Korea's companies, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, for their involvement in proliferating Chemical, Bacteriological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons, freezing their assets and prohibiting transactions.<sup>109</sup> And 25 million dollars' worth of North Korea's financial assets were frozen accordingly.

The fifth round of the six-party talk was held in November, but neither parties could reach an agreement, primarily due to US financial sanction measures against North Korea. No progress has been made regarding implementation of the 9.19 Joint Statement. North Korea announced to pursue the construction of larger "graphite-moderated reactors", which were frozen under 1994 Agreed Framework. Tensions began to gradually escalate in the following year. The KEDO Executive Board announced

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<sup>108</sup> Dick K. Nanto, "North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency," (Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, 2009), RL33324, 1-2.

<sup>109</sup> Arms Control Association, "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Missile Diplomacy," 4.

termination of its projects to build LWRs because of North Korea's persistent noncompliance with obligations.<sup>110</sup>

In this crisis of escalated tensions, the two major provocations were made by North Korea in 2006. On July 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup>, North Korea launched series of ballistic missiles, including a long-range missile, Taepodong-2, which invited UNSC Resolution 1695. Despite international oppositions to North Korea's nuclear test, North Korea eventually conducted its first nuclear test on October 9<sup>th</sup>, which was the most provocative action ever made by North Korea. And five days later, UNSC Resolution 1718 was adopted, which called for a demand on North Korea to refrain from further nuclear tests and it included additional sanctions on commerce.<sup>111</sup>

As written above, the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea can be characterized by its hardline measures against North Korea. Summarizing the examples of hardline policy during Phase one is as followings. Washington tried to ratchet up the pressure on North Korea by placing bilateral economic sanctions according to presidential executive orders, establishing Proliferation Security Initiative(PSI), which was to stop any WMD contraband, and freezing of North Korea's account in Banco Delta Asia, which was suspected of using it as illegal money laundry. Also, the US denied any direct negotiation with North Korea and pursued multilateral setting such as six party talks. Although series of the six party talks were progressed to make joint statement by

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1718," <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/s/res/1718-%282006%29> (Accessed January 1, 2018).

all participants regarding North Korean nuclear issue, it went into a stalemate due to its ambiguous clauses in the joint statement leading up to different interpretation among the participants. North Korea's long-range missile test and its first nuclear test in 2006 resulted in respective UN security council's resolution 1695 and 1718. And those resolutions included multilateral economic and financial sanctions on North Korea in order to prevent further provocation.

In a nutshell, during this phase, the Bush administration refused bilateral negotiation with the North Korean regime to end its nuclear program. US' clear demand of denuclearization on North Korea was delivered, while urgency and punishment were not iterated. However, since US maintained its firm and consistent hardline policy toward North Korea, there were clear sense of urgency and punishment for North Korea, although it was not explicitly expressed in the official statement. Therefore, the strategy of period one for Bush administration's policy toward North Korea can be classified into 'Tacit Ultimatum.' As North Korea's claim to acquire its nuclear weapon was attributed to US' hostile policy, the US coercive diplomacy strategy during phase one failed to change North Korea. Applying prominent factors in the analytical framework would be expected to find out why US's coercive diplomacy failed during this period.

## **1-2. Coercer's Strategy**

### **1-2-1. Proportionality**

The Bush administration's coercive diplomacy strategy toward North Korea

during phase one was by and large imbalanced. Concerning proportionality, the expansiveness of the ends was highly disproportional to the limited means. As Alexander explained this reason in his article, the standard which can determine the proportionality factor in affecting the result of coercive diplomacy is the boundary line between policy change and regime change. Among three types a coercer state chooses in order to change a target state to meet with coercer's demand, pursuing type 3 of suspension of a target's hostile act by changing the composition and nature of its regime is the most challenging one. To pursue regime in North Korea, policy makers have to run great amount of risks unless the situation of the regime is full of instability. It may require significant number of forces and efforts to achieve regime collapse, thereby enabling US to change regime of North Korea. It was examined how difficult it is to implement military options against North Korea in the previous section.

There are many evidence that Bush administration pursued regime change in North Korea. According to Graham Allison, Bush pursued regime change toward North Korea by the end of Bush's first year in his office.<sup>112</sup> In 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush named North Korea among Iraq and Iran as Axis of evil, which were threatening peace and stability of the world. And the US invaded one of these countries to pursue regime change by use of force, and then transplanted the democratic system into Iraq, which took lots of cost for US to implement this policy. And many of his staffs in his term administration belonged to neoconservatives, who had strong faith in pursuing

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<sup>112</sup> Allison, "North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Bush Administration Failure, China's Opportunity," 8.

regime change against non-democratic countries. This value of spreading democracy to the world was highly emphasized in Bush administration's official documents such as NSS, NPR and QDR and in his official remarks. It appears to remain even in Bush's second term in office. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice depicted North Korea as outposts of tyranny in January 2005 and emphasize the need to spread the value of freedom and democracy.<sup>113</sup>

In addition, none of the other participants in the six party talks were supporting US' policy of regime change toward North Korea. Pushing ahead with this aggressive policy would have negative influence on US' reputation as a hostile and stubborn actor, lowering the possibility of cooperation from other countries. Although many of Bush administration's neoconservative official may show countenance with this option, still they will have to face opposition from domestic politics for policy that may entails lots of costs and risks.

It is already difficult enough to coerce the target state's policy, and pursuing a regime change entails clearly lots of risk-taking. The more coercer demands of the target, the higher the target's costs of compliance and the greater the need for coercer strategy. Therefore, Bush administration's strategy toward North Korea during phase was highly disproportional, which made US difficult to achieve its goals.

### **1-2-2. Reciprocity**

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<sup>113</sup> Jang, *Us-Dprk Confrontation : Cold War Confrontation within the Post-Cold War Era*, 120-125.

Nor was there reciprocity for Bush administration during Phase one. While Bush administration regarded North Korea's denuclearization process in a CVID (Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement) manner as the precondition for US to pursue policy such as normalization and signing peace treaty. Since Kim Jung-Il was firmly determined to pursue its nuclear program for its regime survival, it was not easy to coerce them to do so diplomatically with threat of limited force. Since the US denied any bilateral talks with North Korea unless they agreed to denuclearize, the multilateral negotiation table, dubbed as the six-party talk, served as only channel to communicate with North Korea. In the six party talks, China, as a chair of the talks, played a prominent role in mediating between US and North Korea, both of which are inflexible in giving concession to the other. The influence of other countries in the six party talks were great that none of the significant agreements could not be made without these country's support and consent.

In the four rounds of six-party talks (2003-2006) during phase one, US maintained its position of placing denuclearization in the first place, and then pursuing normalization or signing of peace treaty thereafter. However, what North Korea wanted was vice versa. North Korea placed abolishment of US' hostile policy in the first place, then it said it was ready for the denuclearization. From the first through third round of six-party talks, most of talks produced statements which was not meaningful to make any progress. Although, most of the participants would want to achieve denuclearization on the Korean peninsula on the surface, the six participants had diverging interests and preference toward North Korea's nuclear issues. In the fourth round of the six party-talk,

all participants agreed to achieve denuclearization peacefully, on the basis of ‘word for word’ and ‘action for action’ for the implementation of their commitments. It was noteworthy that the September 19<sup>th</sup> Agreement of 2005 was the first agreement in the form of ‘Joint Statement’ that all participants agreed to carry out their obligations in a reciprocal manner. All participants were cooperating in exerting pressure for both US and North Korea to make concessions so that they could make progress to be concluded with Joint Statement.

However, due to US’ unilateral statement right after issuance of Joint Statement and US’ enforcement of financial sanction against North Korea’s illegal activities, freezing its assets in BDA account, these formal consents made in the 9.19 agreement couldn’t make any progress until North Korea’s series of provocations in 2006. Only after North Korea’s first nuclear tests could this element of reciprocity begin to act as coercer state’s strategy of coercive diplomacy.

### **1-2-3. Coercive Credibility**

The only one element the Bush administration’s strategy did have was coercive credibility. Although US made an official statement during the second nuclear crisis that all options are on the table to deal with North Korea, the US chose to deal with North Korea’s nuclear issues diplomatically considering the fact that US was already preoccupied with a war against Iraq and Afghanistan at that time. Although Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld mentioned that US could manage major two wars at the same time, even the super power has to calculate the expensive costs and prevalent risks it may



take.<sup>114</sup> Nonetheless, invading one of Axis of evil countries in 2003 and high official's remarks on dealing with North Korea's noncompliance behavior with threat of force was credible enough for North Korea had to make prudent moves against United States.

In the meantime, US also enforced bilateral and multilateral economic sanctions against North Korea. US had already enforced bilateral sanctions against North Korea since the end of Korean War in 1950s. And US tried to impose multilateral sanctions against North Korea in the form of United Nations Security Council Resolutions. During phase one, UNSC resolution 1695 and 1718 were adopted after North Korea's missile launch and its first nuclear test respectively. Since United States already placed bilateral economic sanctions against North Korea, these bilateral economic sanctions were not credible enough to change North Korea's non-complaint behavior. However, what was credible for North Korea was US' financial sanction against North Korea's account in BDA, which totaled up to \$25 billion dollars. Since the money was used as North Korean Leader's private funds. North Korea's constant demand of unfreezing of its account in BDA as a precondition for the negotiation table is demonstrating that this bilateral financial sanction produced credible force against them.<sup>115</sup>

Another dimension to think about is that the prominent influence of China on

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<sup>114</sup> The.Associated.Press, "Rumsfeld Warns N. Korea: U.S. Can Fight Two Wars," <http://www.foxnews.com/story/2002/12/24/rumsfeld-warns-n-korea-us-can-fight-two-wars.html> (Accessed November 21, 2017).

<sup>115</sup> Larry A. Niksch, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy," (Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, 2010), RL33590, 6-10.

North Korea. China's, which has been North Korea's biggest stakeholder, support for US policy toward North Korea of denuclearization was primarily active and supportive during this period. Since US-China relations were pretty much cooperative. In October 2002, president Bush and Jiang met at Crawford Ranch, where they pledged to work together to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. And in early 2003 Bush had several telephone conversations with Jiang and his successor Hu Jintao regarding solutions to North Korea's nuclear program. Also, there had been lots of closer communication and discussion not only between both leaders, but also between high officials. The US was pleased by signs that China was opposed to the North Korean nuclear weapons program and one official noted that China was "in our corner". As such, the US-China relations were in a good mood in terms of dealing with North Korean nuclear issue.<sup>116</sup>

Concerning Chinese activity in solving the North Korean nuclear issue, China played very active role in mediating different attitudes toward the problem. Especially, as a host nation of 6 party talks, China actively engaged in solving the problem in a multilateral setting. China suspended oil supplies to North Korea for three days in order North Korea to be on the table of trilateral talks with the US in 2003. In addition, ever since the 6 party talks were initiated, China made a consistent effort to create mediated settlement and constructive result for all participants. The opposite requirements

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<sup>116</sup> Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Simon Shen, *Conflict and Cooperation in Sino-US Relations : Change and Continuity, Causes and Cures* / Edited by Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Simon Shen (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 112-135.

demanding by both US and North Korea were clearly an obstacle but also diverging interests of other participants such as South Korea, Japan, Russia were also hindering the progress. However, with China's active and consistent "shuttle diplomacy" in this multilateral setting, fundamental and important agreement such as September 19th Joint statement of 2005 on North Korean nuclear issue could be produced. Besides, China increased its pressure on North Korea in 2006 after North Korea launched series of missiles and conducted the first nuclear test. China approved the UNSC resolution to place multilateral sanctions against North Korea and it strongly criticized North Korea's first nuclear test as 'wantonly' (悍然) for the first time, which China used this diplomatic term for describing hostile adversaries.<sup>117</sup> Therefore, China's support for US strategy toward North Korea can be said that it was overall active and supportive in dealing with North Korean nuclear issues due to its converging interest in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.

However, despite China's increasing role in North Korea's nuclear issue, there has been growing frustration among US policy makers against China. Although US allowed China to take the initiatives in the six party talks, North Korea carried out its first nuclear test, disgracing China's efforts. So, their reliance in China in solving North Korean nuclear crisis became frustration. Also, there has been diverging view on how to achieve denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. In the context of international cooperation, none of the other countries in the six party talks supported US' supposedly

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

regime change strategy. Despite the common goal of achievement of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, implementation of regime change accompanies heavy risks and instability. Therefore, international support during period one was generally unfavorable to the US coercive diplomacy strategy.

The Bush administration's coercive diplomacy strategy against North Korea during phase one (from January 2001 to October 2006) can be summarized as below.

- Strategy: Tacit Ultimatum
  - Clear goal and urgency and threat of punishment tacitly delivered
- Proportionality: Low
  - Bush pursued regime change. (Axis of Evil, Bush Doctrine)
- Reciprocity: Low
  - Inflexible North Korean policy. No Carrots provided unless preconditions were met.
- Coercive Credibility: High
  - Threat of force through statements. Imposition of Economic and Financial Sanctions.
- International Support: Unfavorable
  - Despite common goal, none of participants supported regime change.
- Domestic Opposition
  - Neoconservative republicans dominated during phase one with limited opposition.

## **2. Coercive Diplomacy during Phase II: November 2006 – October 2007**

### **2-1. US Strategy during Phase Two: ‘Gradual Turning of the Screw’ mixed with ‘Carrot and Stick’**

North Korea’s first nuclear test on October 9<sup>th</sup>, 2006 was clearly one of the pushing factors for the US to change its policy line toward North Korea. The Bush administration had three choices to pursue against North Korea. They were 1) using forces to destroy nuclear capabilities or weapons of North Korea, 2) strengthening unilateral sanction measures, and 3) negotiations which entails sincere exchanges with North Korea. Needless to say, the first option was too costly but the second option seemed ineffective as well since China and South Korea would strongly oppose it.<sup>118</sup> The remaining option was taken and thus there is significant contrast of US policy toward North Korea between before and after the North Korea’s first nuclear test. Before the nuclear test, the US had maintained its principle of not to engage in direct negotiation with North Korea, but after the test, the US made an attempt to arrange the bilateral meetings with North Korea in late 2006. And finally, the US and North Korea had a direct bilateral talk in Berlin in January 2007 without mediation of China to deal with ongoing crisis.

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<sup>118</sup> Chinoy, *Meltdown : The inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* / Mike Chinoy, 43-48.

On February 13<sup>th</sup>, the fifth round of the six party talks was concluded with agreement. The core part of this agreement was that all participants from six countries agreed to take mutually coordinated measures to implement September 19<sup>th</sup> Agreement by step by step on the basis of ‘action’ for ‘action’. Namely, the 2.13 agreement was to implement initial step of freezing North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Also, notable thing about this agreement is that it stipulated the process of freeze and disablement by measures for each step with reciprocate measures. And participants agreed to establish five working groups<sup>119</sup> for the phased implementation of the 9.19 Agreement to materialize.

North Korea was committed to freezing the plutonium production facility in Yongbyon. And Bush administration made a further effort to ensure the constructive progress in North Korea’s freeze of its nuclear facilities. Anyway, Bush continued to negotiate with North Korea US made several significant concessions for North Korea’s favor. First, the US unfrozeed the North Korea’s account in BDA, which was amounted up to \$25 million and a main hindrance of progress in September 19<sup>th</sup> deal in 2005. Second, the US has pledged to remove North Korea from the list of both “Trade with enemy act” and “State Sponsors of Terrorism”, in the hope that North Korea would fully implement its commitments made in the recent agreement of February 13<sup>th</sup> Deal in 2007 in the form of Joint Statement, which led North Korea officially to destroy its cooler tower in Yongbyon facility as commitment in the disablement process. Although US’

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<sup>119</sup> Which consisted of Denuclearization, Normalization, Cooperation, North East Asia’s Peace and Security.

commitment for unfreeze of BDA account for North Korea was not stipulated in the agreement, they promised to do so.

Therefore, February 13<sup>th</sup> agreement achieved meaningful progress in achieving North Korea's denuclearization in that it realized the initial step of implementation process. And it was apparent that this was the clearly the result of adjusted US policy toward North Korea. US broke its principle of sticking to six party talk as only channel to deal with North Korea's nuclear issues. And what make this agreement prominent compared to Agreed Framework and 9.19 Agreement was that North Korea not only agreed to freeze its nuclear facilities but also it agreed eventual dismantlement of its entire nuclear program. So, US could pursue their objective of denuclearization through negotiations in the six party talks. In addition, this agreement had specific timeline for implementation. It stipulated that North Korea should close and seal nuclear facilities, allow IAEA inspections, and consult with other participant for the list of all nuclear programs. US' obligation included that it should pursue bilateral talks with North Korea and take measures to eliminate from the list of sponsors of terrorism and terminate the application of Trade with Enemy Act on North Korea. Participant's obligations were to provide initial 50 thousand tons of HFO of 1 million tons in the later steps. And these obligations should be carried out within 60 days. Therefore, this 2.13 deal has more binding force for the implementation of commitments than the bilateral agreements since the six countries are the signatories.

The sixth round of six-party talks began in March, but after four days the

negotiation was suspended because North Korea announced that they would not participate unless the US transfers the frozen funds of \$25 million in BDA. On Mar 19<sup>th</sup>, US and North Korea reached a mutual understanding that US would accept North Korea's proposals that US transfers the fund frozen in BDA to bank of China, and North Korea announced that would will use the funds only for the betterment of their people. And on June 25, North Korea confirmed that \$25 million was transferred to them and declared that they would shut down the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. The IAEA inspectors were allowed in the following month, and they verified the freeze of Yongbyon nuclear facilities.

With five working group's meeting on August and bilateral talks between US and North Korea, the sixth round of the six party talks were concluded with Agreement in the form of joint statement on October 3rd to carry out the 2<sup>nd</sup> phase of implementing the 2.13 Agreement. In the new 10.3 Agreement, it obligated North Korea to provide 'complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs', which should include not only Plutonium but also Uranium program, and disable 5MW nuclear reactor, plutonium reprocessing facilities and nuclear fuel rod facilities. This time again, participants imposed deadline for North Korea to carry out its commitments by the end of 2007. Also, North Korea declared not to transfer any nuclear materials, related technology and know-hows to third countries in any case. In return for North Korea's action, the US agreed to fulfill its commitment to remove from the list of state sponsor of terrorism and trade with the enemy act. And other participants agreed to provide remaining 900,000 tons of HFO,



which was pledged in 2.13 Agreement.<sup>120</sup>

US has maintained clear demand or objective of denuclearization against North Korea. Although, both the 2.13 and 10.3 agreement stipulated deadline for North Korea to implement its commitments, since there were not any punitive measures in case it did not meet deadline. It is hard to say that timeline for the target state was set out. As for punishment, as seen in the UNSC Resolution 1695 and 1718, US was gradually widening the scope of sanctions against North Korea while there was no significant increase in degree. Also, there was no measures taken to withdraw bilateral or multilateral sanctions, and these remained in place. So, it is possible to say that the US has employed strategy of “Gradual Turning of the Screw.” In the meantime, the prominent features of both agreements of 2.13 and 10.3 are that implementation of these agreement are primarily based on the principle of ‘Action for Action’ and both are taking the gradual step by step measures. While maintaining the costs of target state’s non-compliance, the US provided incentives for North Korea’s compliance with its agreement. Therefore, the US’ coercive diplomacy during phase two can be labeled as ‘Gradual Turning of the Screw’ mixed with ‘Carrot and Stick Approach.’

Summarizing phase two of following North Korea’s first nuclear test until the 10.3 agreement was concluded, US was in the process of persuading North Korea’s to meet its demand of denuclearization. And North Korea during this phase showed

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<sup>120</sup> Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea: Terrorism List Removal?,” (Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, 2009), RL30613, 1.

willingness to comply with US demand. So, the remaining section will make an attempt to analyze the success or limited success factors (due to North Korea's reverse and withdrawal of its commitments in later phase) during phase two by the application of revised Bruce Jentleson's Analytical Framework.

## **2-2. Coercer's Strategy**

### **2-2-1. Proportionality**

As opposed to the previous phase, the level of proportionality during phase two turned out to be sufficiently high enough for US to pursue its Coercive diplomacy strategy against North Korea. Underlying reason for high proportionality is that US did not pursue regime change any more during phase two. North Korea's first nuclear test has frustrated those hardliner in the US. Ever since North Korea's first nuclear test, the US returned to accommodative approach against North Korea, which was generally in line with his predecessor's engagement policy with them and its main instrument of US policy toward North Korea has been diplomatic negotiations. Phase two is the period when US and North Korea were carrying out the very first step of denuclearization process. This first step was to freeze nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in return for providing energy and financial assistance to North Korea as agreed in the February 13<sup>th</sup> Deal of 2007. Implementation of freeze of North Korea's nuclear facilities would fall under Type A objective, which is the most achievable options among the three. While not confusing with US' long-term objective of eventual denuclearization on the Korean

Peninsula, its short-term goal was to implement the first step of the 2.13 agreement. The instruments to employ to achieve its short-term goal was enough. US had various options to deal with North Korea's nuclear issues such as bilateral and multilateral talks, economic and financial sanctions and so on.

Summarizing this section, if a coercer's state pursues policy change and not regime change against a target state, coercer's proportionality between ends and means is more likely to be maintained. By announcing the option of pursuing non-hostile policy toward North Korea such as signing the peace treaty between US and North Korea and declaring that US would not invade North Korea in the agreement, the US tried to assure that it would pursue a policy change, not a regime change in the hope that North Korea would not tackle in the negotiation process by bringing up the issue of US' suspected and clandestine pursuit of regime change in North Korea.

### **2-2-2. Reciprocity**

One of the prominent feature during phase two would be that US used its adept diplomacy to maintain high level of reciprocity against North Korea. As for reciprocity, the negotiating strategy of measured linkages between the carrots offered and the concessions demanded made this element significantly enhanced during this period. During this period, US had official bilateral negotiation with North Korea for the first time in Bush administration's period. North Korea had been demanding US to pursue direct bilateral talks with them, but Bush administration turned down their offer in the previous phase. In the February 13<sup>th</sup> agreement of 2007, in exchange for North Korea's

disablement of its nuclear program and weapons, the US agreed to provide HFO (heavy fuel oil) of a million ton to North Korea and make further advancement such as normalization and signing peace treaty on the Korean peninsula, and establishment of working group. As the spirit of implementation of September 19<sup>th</sup> Deal of 2005 was ‘word for word’ and ‘action for action’, the 2.13 agreement is characterized by its gradual and multi-phased implementation.

In the meantime, North Korea’s priority in negotiation with US during this phase was that they wanted to reclaim its financial assets which were frozen in BDA in the previous year for its involvement in counterfeit activities. In the 2.13 agreement, participants agreed to implement what was listed as their commitments to complete within 60 days, which the deadline for the implementation would be on April 13<sup>th</sup>. It was only after that North Korea took the freeze measures once they got their financial assets back into their pocket. Of course, the US made concession to make this happen since the sources of frozen money in BDA was expected to be mainly from those illegal counterfeit activities. But by doing so, US could induce North Korea to complete the first step of implementation process. Also, as agreed in the 2.13 deal of 2007, US initially delivered its 50,000 tons of HFO to North Korea. And the rest of 950,000 tons of HFO was delivered separately according to status of North Korea’s implementation of its commitments in the agreement made further steps in the progress.<sup>121</sup>

Therefore, the US strategy during phase two showed great level of reciprocity,

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<sup>121</sup> Arms Control Association, "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Missile Diplomacy," 18.

contributing to North Korea's implementation of freeze on its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and invitation of IAEA inspectors for verification. So, this freeze process was smoothly completed and further laid the ground for the next agreement of the second step of implementation, which is disablement. With coordination among working groups, the October 3<sup>rd</sup> agreement of 2007 was concluded with unanimous consent from participants from the six-party talks.

### **2-2-3. Coercive Credibility**

In terms of coercive credibility, we might confuse with the fact that there was lack of any punitive measure against North Korea during this phase, and it can mislead people to think that probably coercive credibility of the US was not enough. However, this is not the case. As written above, US pursued diplomatic solution in dealing with North Korean nuclear program by having lots of bilateral and multilateral talks with North Korea. Rather than relying on threat of use of force or strengthening sanction against them, the US decided to exert pressure in the form of multilateral pressure in the negotiation table. Furthermore, the US maintained bilateral and multilateral sanctions in place against North Korea. Note that the frozen assets in BDA account, which North Korea claimed to get it back, was released only after June, implying that North Korea had to comply with US' demand of carrying out freeze measure on their nuclear facilities, in order to acquire the frozen financial assets.

Although some pundits analyzed that UNSC resolution against North Korea was ineffective to expect any change from their behavior, we could see that it widened

the scope and strengthened the contents of the resolution 1718 compared to previous resolution 1695, which was adopted just three months before. It has limitation in contents itself that it does not entail any complete or comprehensive embargo or interdiction measures but UNSC as its part did gradually strengthen the level of sanctions against North Korea, increasing the pressure accordingly, whether the measures would be effective for North Korea to suspend its hostile provocation or not.

There are two bilateral sanctions that US imposed against North Korea during phase two. In December 2006, President Bush applied sanctions under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act 22, which is also known as Glenn Amendment, and the Atomic Energy Act 42. These are to apply certain sanctions to non-nuclear weapons states that have detonated nuclear weapons. These two bilateral sanctions were significant, because US had provided assistance to North Korea since the Agreed Framework in 1994. So, applying these sanctions would certainly have an impact on North Korea.<sup>122</sup>

In addition, considering the factor of international cooperation, the other participants blamed North Korea for its first nuclear test and decided further to cooperate with each other to carry out denuclearization process in North Korea. In case for China, it criticized North Korea's nuclear test wantonly, by using words, which it used to depict those hostile countries. Without any consent or cooperation from these participants, the

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<sup>122</sup> Karin Lee and Julia Choi, "U.S. Sanctions and Treasury Department Actions against North Korea from 1955 to October 2007," review of North Korean Review 4, no. 1 (2008): 7-25.

two-major agreement would not be produced, considering the fact that issuing Joint Statement from participants who had diverging interests even on single subject. Thus, the level of cooperation among these parties were high that this factor of international support had a great amount influence on enhancing United States' coercive credibility against North Korea.

Though the US hasn't threatened North Korea by use of force during this phase, the US had the capability to carry out against North Korea. Namely, its credibility hasn't been reduced compared to hardline policy in phase one. The only difference was that these aggressive measures were not announced even if they had the capability to do so. And one of reasons for this speculation is that the Bush administration learned from Phase One that aggressive or assertive policy toward North Korea had negative impact on its strategy of coercive diplomacy, since North Korea would blame those harsh measures as hostile policy against North Korea and they may further deteriorate the crisis.

In the meantime, there is lack of evidence that US was trying to enhance this element. Since the latter term of Bush administration was pretty much tilting toward the diplomacy, there was clearly a lack of efforts to delineate strong will of threat of punishment in the event of North Korea's noncompliance. Although, US was consistently maintaining the multilateral sanctions implemented against North Korea, it didn't adequately prepare for further punitive measure and make official statement, in the midst of negotiation progress seemingly as if walking along the right path to its objective.

The pattern of three elements of US' coercer strategy turned out to be well-balanced and well carried out during this period. During Phase Two, US had significantly improved the element of proportionality and reciprocity, while retaining coercive credibility against North Korea. Furthermore, the international or regional actors were supportive in carrying out US' objective of freeze of Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Also, there was no sign of significant opposition from US domestic politics. Since the dependent variable is North Korea's compliance with agreement, we can say that US' coercive diplomacy during phase was successful. However, since this North Korea's freeze measures in the process of disablement were reversed two year later, it is rather called as 'limited success in phase two' in this thesis.

The Bush administration's coercive diplomacy strategy toward North Korea during phase two (from November 2006 to October 2007) can be summarized as below.

- Strategy: Gradual Turning of the Screw + Carrot and Stick Approach
  - Clear goal but gradual level of threats for punishment. US concessions made.
- Proportionality: High
  - Bush pursued policy change of denuclearization in North Korea
- Reciprocity: High
  - Balanced threat of punishment and concession. (direct talks, provision of HFO)
- Coercive Credibility: High
  - Multilateral Sanctions through UNSC 1695/1718. Economic & Financial bilateral sanction continued.



- International Support: Favorable
  - Strong oppositions against nuclear test, Thrust for Freeze process, 2.13 & 10.3 agreements yielded.
- Domestic Opposition: Limited
  - Negotiation strategy was agreed by major party members

### **3. Coercive Diplomacy during Phase III: November 2007 – January 2009**

#### **3-1. US Strategy during Phase Three – ‘Try and See’**

Phase III covers from November 2007, when North Korea began its disablement process, to January 2009, in which Bush administration wind up its term of office.

In November 2007, a team of US experts arrived in North Korea and started to lead the disablement process. The disablement process contained 11 steps. In the following months, they found out traces of enriched uranium on aluminum tubes but North Korea denied by saying that it was used for conventional weapons. As such, North Korea had been denying the existence of HEU. In the meantime, North Korea was supposed to finish both declaration on all its nuclear programs and disablement of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon as pledged in the 10.3 Agreement, they did not meet the deadline. North Korea, however, argued they worked on declaration report and passed it

on to the US side and criticized participant's delayed commitment for delivery of HFO, threatening to slow down the disablement process.

In April 2008, bilateral agreement between US and North Korea was reached in Singapore, requiring North Korea's declaration to include its plutonium based nuclear programs and its acknowledgement of US allegation of its proliferation and UEP. In the following month, North Korea provided 18,000 pages of documents regarding plutonium-related facilities at Yongbyon and finally delivered declaration of its nuclear program to China in June. In return, US removed the application of Trading with Enemy act to North Korea, which will allow US company to import North Korean goods and sell non-strategic items to them. And President Bush signed into a law to waive sanctions on North Korea related to 1994 Glenn Amendment imposed on North Korea since its first nuclear test. Also, the disablement process was making progress. He announced that "8 of 11 processes has been completed" in June.<sup>123</sup>

In the meantime, there was a problem that North Korea's declaration omitted components such as the number of North Korea's nuclear weapons, information about nuclear facilities, and location where North Korea place its nuclear weapons, HEU program and reported collaboration with Syria. In the process of North Korea's working on declaration on late April, Israel's air strike against suspected Syrian nuclear facilities on September 6<sup>th</sup> of 2007 was found that the target was nuclear reactor which was about

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<sup>123</sup> Mary Beth Nikitin, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues," (Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, 2013), RL34256, 18-19.

to be completed and it was modeled after North Korea. There was apparent evidence such as photographs and satellite images which showed North Korea's involvement and collaboration with Syria's nuclear program. However, there was no further US' punitive measures against this.

In July, the six parties agreed to set the target date of October 31, 2008 for the completion of disablement of Nuclear Facilities at Yongbyon and delivery of HFO and energy assistance. And they also agreed on verification principles such as 1) "visits to facilities, 2) review of documents, 3) interviews with technical personnel, and 4) other sites would have be agreed unilaterally among six parties. And IAEA would only play as an advisory role."<sup>124</sup> However, in August Bush administration presented its draft protocol on verification of North Korea's program, which give the right for US and other parties to inspect all over the North Korea's territory, conditioning on removal from list of state sponsor of terrorism depend on whether North Korea accept this. In response to this, North Korea threatened to retaliate by suspending disablement process and restart the program. In September, they announced that they completed removing seals from nuclear reprocessing facility and would introduce nuclear materials in a week.

US, backing down on North Korea's retaliatory response, scaled back the scope of verification. Assistant secretary of State, Christopher Hill visited North Korea in October and negotiated on verification protocol, which would focus only Yongbyon facilities with North Korea, and they finally agreed and announced the resumptions of

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<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 24.

disablement process. In return, US finally removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Compared to trading with enemy act, elimination of list of state sponsors of terrorism has lots of meanings for North Korea. Most of all, it will end the requirement that US president oppose financial aid to North Korea and they can possibly secure financial aids from institutions such as IMF and World Bank. Furthermore, there were three motives behind them. First, it would reduce US support for Japan on kidnapping issues which can be linked with terrorism support list. Second, it would limit any US incentives to examine the issue of North Korea's activities in the middle east, which they were suspected of providing training and weapons missiles and nuclear technology to terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guards.<sup>125</sup> Third, it was expected to improve relations with US, possibly normalization, for North Korea.

In the meantime, this disablement process met another obstacle of sampling issues. Sampling would give information of past traces of nuclear activities, and North Korea didn't allow any samplings for the inspectors. In fact, this agreement over sampling issues turned out to be verbally understanding made by Hill and North Korea's officials when he visited in October for negotiation over verification issues. In December of the six party's meetings, the disablement, verification, and energy assistance ended in a stalemate, after all. US announced that delivery of HFO would not take place unless North Korea continue with verification process.

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 28.

**Table 8. The Disablement Process in North Korea, 2008-2009<sup>126</sup>**

<b>Step</b>	<b>Facility</b>	<b>Status</b>
Discharge of 8000 spent fuel rods to the spent fuel pool	5-megawatt reactor	6,400 completed as of April 2009
Removal of control rod drive mechanisms	5-megawatt reactor	To be done after spend fuel removal completed
Removal of reactor cooling loop and wooden cooling tower interior structure	5-megawatt reactor	Tower demolished June 26, 2008
Disablement of fresh fuel rods	Fuel fabrication facility	Not agreed to by North Korea: consultations held Jan. 2009 with South Korea on possibility of purchase
Removal and storage and three uranium ore concentrate dissolver tanks	Fuel fabrication facility	Completed
Removal and storage of seven uranium conversion furnaces, including storage of refractory bricks and mortar sand	Fuel fabrication facility	Completed
Removal and storage of both metal casing furnaces and vacuum system, and removal and storage of eight machining lathes	Fuel fabrication facility	Completed
Cut Cable and remove drive mechanism associated with the receiving hot cell door	Reprocessing facility	Completed
Cut two of four steam lines into reprocessing facility	Reprocessing facility	Completed
Removal of drive mechanisms for the fuel cladding shearing and slitting machines	Reprocessing facility	Completed

The disablement process which began November 2008, continued through April 2009 in which North Korea halted the process. North Korea periodically slowed the

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 19.

disablement process from August to October over removal of state sponsor of terrorist issues and verification. In the end, all the agreements were not carried out when Bush administration left office in 2009.

All the concessions made by Bush administration for North Korea's denuclearization went to become futile after all. This clearly frustrated those wishful thinkers among negotiators. There hasn't been significant difference in US' approach toward North Korea. As opposed to previous period, the US made an attempt to return to direct negotiation table with North Korea. While not indicating threat of punishment for North Korea's noncompliance, the US only provided incentives such as elimination from the terrorism list and trading with enemy act for North Korea's reciprocal behavior. And US further tried to increase the level of inducement and made a lot of concessions for North Korea in securely implementing the agreements. But there were no sticks of convincing North Korea that US will punish for their noncompliant behavior. Therefore, the US strategy pursued toward North Korea during this phase became much attenuated from previous phase while it lacked in element of punishment. So, US Strategy toward North Korea this phase was much closer to 'Try and see approach.' In the meantime, it would be fruitful work to find out which factor exacerbated US' Coercive Diplomacy in achieving its objective against North Korea.

### **3-2. Coercer's Strategy**

#### **3-2-1. Proportionality**

The Bush administration has pursued policy change throughout the end of his term. There was no sign that Bush reversed his objective and returned to regime change. As October 3<sup>rd</sup> Agreement of 2007 was reached, the implementation of disablement process began. And US' objective during phase three would be successful implementation of disablement, along with inducing complete declaration of North Korea. The negotiation and implementation process appeared to made some progress in June 2008, when North Korea completed the declaration and submitted it to China and destroyed the cooling tower at Yongbyon, which many people from outside watched on live television broadcasting the scene.

However, both US and North Korea had disagreement over verification protocol. And this led to suspension of all the efforts to implement the denuclearization process in the end of 2008. It's not clear whether demanding stricter and more complete verification (i.e. sampling) on North Korea would be classified as too burdensome for North Korea. Furthermore, US couldn't employ international pressure on this, because the verification deal was done bilaterally between US and North Korea in October. North Korea rejected any attempt to allow sampling at its nuclear facilities.

But overall, the Bush administration's strategy during phase three maintained sufficient amount of proportionality, which they had pursued from the previous phase. Therefore, the element of proportionality was well achieved.


### **3-2-2. Reciprocity**

Reviewing the negotiation process in this period, it is able to notice that US did make lots of concession in order to make progress in the implementation of agreement. Whether that was due to the fact that it was the last year for the Bush's second-term administration so they might want to finish the implementation of the second step agreement by making lots of concession to North Korea is not the focus of this analysis. It is rather to focus on how US managed to reciprocate with North Korea's compliance or noncompliance in implementing the disablement process.

The 10.3 agreement required North Korea to declare its entire nuclear program including HEU program and complete the disablement process by the end of the year. North Korea's declaration draft was not enough. In Singapore negotiation, North Korea agreed with declaration on plutonium-based nuclear weapons but only acknowledged the US allegation of North Korea's proliferation and HEU activities, which meant they might not declare their hidden nuclear program. Anyway, when North Korea submitted its declaration, which was flawed and incomplete, to China, the US eliminated North Korea from the Trading with the enemy act immediately and waved the sanctions under the Glenn Amendment, along with mentioning elimination from possibly the list of state sponsor of terrorism.



**Figure 6. Action-Reaction Chains during Phase Three, Nov 2007 – Jan 2009**



The focus of implementation in latter half of 2008 was verification of disablement process. North Korea allowed only Yongbyon nuclear facilities, while prohibiting to inspect other areas. When this disagreement over verification protocol

continued to prevail, North Korea deliberately threatened to slow down the disablement process. So, Hill visited North Korea to strike a deal with North Korea to make progress, but without any written agreement, and when North Korea agreed to do so, US finally removed from the list of state sponsor of terrorism. But North Korea rejected to allow sampling for inspectors and in the end, this led to a stalemate.

It appears that US and North Korea tried to maintain quid pro quo during this period. Whenever there was a disagreement, US made concessions through mainly bilateral talks for disablement process to make progress. North Korea carried out their commitment to some extent by completing almost 80% of the disablement process. However, there was lack of US punitive measures for North Korea's suspected incompletion or noncooperation with the agreement. US found out North Korea's multiple signs of running HEU program and collaboration with Syria in terms of developing nuclear weapons. In addition, North Korea's declaration was not complete in that Yongbyon was not the only nuclear facility for their nuclear program. But US pushed ahead with bearing these drawbacks until the end of Bush administration's term. Whereas US lifted three bilateral sanctions against North Korea, it didn't impose any additional punitive measure for North Korea.

Therefore, to argue that US had maintained reciprocity against North Korea, the US should have taken corresponding measures to North Korea, against which they did not. So, reciprocity during phase three became largely weaker than the previous one.

### **3-2-3. Coercive Credibility**

Coercive credibility is closely related with points made above. As written above, there was no punitive measures or threat of force against North Korea's noncompliance. US maintained coercive measures against North Korea such as bilateral and economic sanctions. As of December 2008, US released several bilateral economic and financial sanctions but maintained multilateral sanction such as UNSC resolution 1695 and its follow-up of 1718.

However, these economic sanctions in place against North Korea did not seem to be effective at all. According a CRS report, it analyzed that US' economic sanction against North Korea was not effective but financial sanction were influential to some extent. In terms of bilateral sanctions, US has been already imposing them long before then and North Korea's major source of economic benefits came from other countries other than the US.


In terms of trade, North Korea has relied on China and South Korea during phase three. The production from Kaesong Industrial Complex were significant. they reached almost \$250 million, which has gradually been increasing.<sup>127</sup> Although trade was not subject under the sanctions imposed against North Korea, they have increased the amount of trade with other countries. The amount of imports and exports between US and North Korea were almost close to nil compared to other major countries.

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<sup>127</sup> Institute for Far Eastern Studies, "Kaesong Exports Grow, Labor Shortages Worsen," review of NK Brief, no. 09-11-23-1 (2009).

The effectiveness of UNSC Resolution 1718 was merely nothing more than symbolic. The resolution itself does not impose entire embargo rather it imposes transfer of weapon system or related technology. The trade volume for North Korea rather increased in 2008. In addition, it lacks explanation on interdiction effort to block North Korea's illegal transfer to the third countries. Although it stipulated that luxury goods should be banned but Figure 7 shows that China was not interested in following UNSC resolutions in terms of ban on selling luxury goods to North Korea.

**Figure 7. China's Exports of Luxury Goods to North Korea, 2005-2010<sup>128</sup>**



**Source:** Underlying data accessed through Global Trade Atlas.

**Notes:** The list of luxury items are from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Computers include only those less than 10 kg (laptops).

<sup>128</sup> Nanto and Manyin, "China-North Korea Relations" (Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, 2013), R41043, 21.

In terms of coercive credibility, a target state's perception on coercive measure is also important. Therefore, those bilateral and multilateral sanctions led by US during phase III was not enough to credibly coerce North Korea to implement agreements. It remains question of whether North Korea's main motivation was not driven by these sanctions but rather in other area or their interest. For this reason, the coercive credibility of United States against North Korea during phase three was generally weaker than the previous phase.

The Bush administration's coercive diplomacy strategy against North Korea during phase three (from November 2007 to January 2009) can be summarized as below.

- Strategy: Try and See Approach
  - Only clear demand without urgency and threat for punishment delivered
- Proportionality: High
  - Continued to pursue policy change (Denuclearization)
- Reciprocity: Low
  - US made lots of concessions but without threat punishment. (No Sticks but only Carrots)
- Coercive Credibility: Medium to Low
  - US made no threatening measures against NK's aberration.
- International Support: Insufficient
  - China's incomppliance with UN Sanctions against NK. Lack of momentum due to sampling.

- Domestic Opposition: Limited
  - No significant oppositions.

#### **4. Summary: Three Phases of Bush Administration's Coercive Diplomacy Strategy toward North Korea**

The Bush administration's coercive diplomacy strategy toward North Korea in all three phases of its term in office can be by all counts summarized as follows.

In the first phase, Bush administration's policy is generally characterized by hardline. While he announced to solve with North Korean nuclear issue diplomatically rather than militarily, he imposed lots of sanctions, restrictions against North Korea. Strategy in phase one belongs to tacit ultimatum. In terms of coercer strategy, while US maintained coercive credibility, it failed to achieve proportionality and reciprocity against North Korea. North Korea hasn't been following Agreed Framework of 1994 ever since the second nuclear crisis occurred. So, because of these factors, Bush administration's coercive diplomacy toward North Korea failed in phase one.

In the second phase, the overall orientation of Bush's policy toward North Korea changed drastically from its confrontational policy to accommodational policy after the first nuclear test, which can be seen from US' emphasis in dealing with North Korean nuclear issue by dialogues and negotiation including bilateral talks. While US gradually increased pressure on North Korea through UNSC Resolution 1718 and

additional bilateral sanctions, it provided lots of undeniable incentives to North Korea to make progress. Therefore, Bush's strategy during phase two can be classified as 'gradual turning of the screw' and 'carrot and stick approach' at the same time. And it turned out that all three elements of coercer strategy were balanced along with active domestic and international support. The word 'limited' was placed ahead of success because of North Korea's reverse of its commitment in early 2009, but it was apparent that US induced North Korea to successfully comply with its demand.

**Table 9. Evaluation on Bush Administration's Coercive Diplomacy Strategy toward North Korea, 2001-2009**

Period	Strategy	Independent Variables			Evaluation
		Proportionality	Reciprocity	Coercive Credibility	
<b>Phase I</b> (2001.1 - 2006.10)	Tacit Ultimatum	X	X	O	Failure
<b>Phase II</b> (2006.11 – 2007.10)	Gradual Turning of the Screw + Carrot and Stick	O	O	O	Limited Success
<b>Phase III</b> (2007.11 – 2009.1)	Try and See	O	X	Δ	Failure

In the last phase, as continuation from the previous one, US pushed ahead the implementation process for North Korea's denuclearization. In the process, US made significant amount of concession to North Korea. But it did not use coercive measures against North Korea even when it had to, thereby decreasing reciprocity and coercive

credibility with only element of proportionality remain unchanged. Bush administration's strategy even scaled down to 'try and see approach' in the absence of 'carrot and stick' element. So, these factors led to failure for US to complete the disablement process in the end of Bush's term in office in January 2009.



## IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

So far, this thesis has explained the change of US policy toward North Korea during the Bush administration's period with the analytical framework based on the theory of 'Coercive Diplomacy' with an assumption that North Korea's first nuclear test was the turning point of Bush's drastic policy change toward North Korea. Now let us get back to research questions raised in the beginning.

In order to answer the question for the reason why US couldn't maintain its hardline policy toward North Korea, though preexisting literatures were primarily focusing on US domestic factors such as result of mid-term elections and personnel change in the administration in the second term, the US policy makers were frustrated with the fact that inflexible hardline policy, which can be also referred to as 'tacit ultimatum', failed in changing North Korea's provocative behavior, especially in the event of North Korea's first nuclear test. This can be also explained by lack of coercer's strategy especially in the domain of proportionality and reciprocity. Although China played an active role as a host nation of the six party talks, China still regarded North Korean nuclear issue as bilateral issue between the US and North Korea. And China's different policy priority on the Korean peninsula and go-slow attitude toward the issue further made the US hardline policy toward North Korea ineffective after all.

Regarding what if question of Bush's consistent hardline policy toward North Korea no matter what kind of factors might have influenced, if Bush had maintained its

continuous and inflexible pressure on North Korea, it would definitely have further aggravated the tensions. As an answer to the first question demonstrated, the lack of well-tuned coercer's strategy would be one of primary obstacles to effectual implementation of hardline policy. Furthermore, the risks and costs that war may incur revealed that the military option was no more than just an option which was not likely to be chosen, considering the fact that the expected massive casualty it may bring from North Korea's retaliatory attack and difficulty of locating and targeting North Korea's hidden nuclear weapons would make it much less plausible option.

The policy shift of US led to partial changes in North Korea. Different from the previous phase, US has made lots of concessions for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons. And North Korea accordingly carried out the very first step of freeze in its nuclear facilities. But US couldn't complete the second step of disablement process in the end over the disagreement in verification issue and lack of coercer strategy in the last phase. In addition, this research examined that international factors to pursue US coercive diplomacy strategy was tremendous. Without sincere support from the regional key actors, it is hard for US to achieve goal of denuclearization in North Korea.

For these reasons above, even the superpower finds it so difficult coerce a noncompliant target state. As statistics has shown, pursuing coercive diplomacy strategy turned out to be challenging. It is not a simple prescription. Indeed, it turned out to be quite challenging. But offensive coercion which entails lots of risks and costs are even more difficult. Notwithstanding, as some of the successful cases for US' coercive

diplomacy strategy has shown, there's still a chance of success.

Therefore, several policy implications were drawn out of this research. First, pursuing regime change can be counterproductive to achieving policy change. Pursuing a regime change requires significant amount of time and costs for coercer to successfully utilize its coercive diplomacy, which will significantly lower the possibility of success. Therefore, policy change would definitely be more plausible and realistic options to take.

Second, multilateral support is crucial for successful coercive diplomacy strategy. This is also related with a factor of coercive credibility among coercer's strategy. In implementing credible pressure against a target state, the UNSC resolution is by far the most legitimate and powerful instrument to take. Therefore, the key to effective usage of this multilateral mechanism lies in factors how participants related to the issue can narrow down their diverging interests and widen converging common interests, which would significantly affect the results.

Third, there is greater potential complementarity between force and diplomacy than more singular advocates of one or the other tend to convey. While the actual use of force would be the simplest option, it is very costly for the most of the time. And while diplomacy, coercive diplomacy specifically, can be one of the cheapest options to take, it may be extremely hard to change the target's behavior. Therefore, in order to make coercive diplomacy more successful, the limited use of force or the threat of use of force should always be placed in one of the plausible options so that it may work to credibly influence the target state.

Fourth, in the negotiation process, the level of a quid pro quo for compliance and threat of punishment should be balanced. The problem of Bush administration's North Korea policy before the first nuclear test was that a threat of punishment was higher and inducements for compliance was scarce. This opposite goes to the latter periods. In the third phase, US relied too much on incentives while it didn't use sticks appropriately when it had to. So, the incentives for compliance and threat of punishments for non-compliance should always be maintained as balanced.

Fifth, China's attitude toward North Korean nuclear issue is very critical. As we found out, China is North Korea's biggest stakeholder, which do not want an unstable situation on the peninsula, so multilateral and bilateral sanctions against North Korea can be ineffective in case of China's opposition. It is the matter of how to convince and persuade China into joining in the same coalition group of unified goal orientation.

Lastly, this is related with previous point. In order to increase coercive credibility against North Korea, China holds the key, since it is North Korea's major economic partner. The sanction, whether it was bilateral or multilateral, appeared not to work that much to change North Korea's behavior except for financial sanctions. At the same time, while not relying on the actual use of military force, US should occasionally deliver credible warning that threatening regional peace and security by developing nuclear weapons and launching long-range missile would bring serious conflict which it may have no other option but to use force. And this should not be seen as empty rhetoric by the North Korean regime.

## V. CONCLUSION

This research attempted to analyze George W. Bush's policy toward North Korea. After eight years of Obama presidency's 'strategic patience' with fruitless result, The Trump administration initiated its term in office in January 2017. It marks the first year of President Trump's inauguration at the time of writing of this thesis. Meanwhile, North Korea has tested lots of missiles, including long-range ICBM, for about 16 times in 2017.<sup>129</sup> And also, North Korea conducted the 6th nuclear test in September 2017. The UN Security Council has passed Resolution 2371, 2375 and 2397 respectively after North Korea's major provocations in 2017, calling for suspension of North Korea's nuclear hostilities and abandonment of nuclear weapons and gradually increasing the level of sanctions including exports of petroleum to North Korea.<sup>130</sup> However, there is no indication that North Korea would compromise for the abandonment of their means to survive in any time soon.

Compared to Bush administration, the current Trump administration is facing North Korea with much accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons and much advanced missile capabilities. North Korea has successfully miniaturized and enhanced the level of nuclear weapon technology. Also, North Korea's already gone through leadership transition, of which their new leader seemed to harbor stauncher objective on their path

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<sup>129</sup> Joshua Berlinger, "North Korea's Missile Tests: What You Need to Know," <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html> (Accessed December 4, 2017).

<sup>130</sup> United.Nations.Security.Council, "Resolution 2397," <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2397> (Accessed January 7, 2018).

to a nuclear state. Situation has gradually changed with North Korea heading closer to an actual nuclear state for the last 9 years since Bush administration left office. However, if we had a closer look on Bush administration's period, there are lots of commonalities between Bush and Trump administration. Both are characterized by none prior experience in diplomacy and the Republican governed executives represented by conservative and tough approaches on those states which do not conform to international norms and values. Like Bush, Trump has been using lots of aggressive words to degrade North Korean leader and his regime. Trump has made provocative comments such as 'Rocket Man', 'Fire and Fury', 'Mad man', 'Bigger Nuclear Button' against North Korea and its leader through his Twitter.<sup>131</sup> Therefore, it would be meaningful work to apply factors made during the first year of Trump's presidency into the theory and analytical framework used in this thesis.

On March 2017, The US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson mentioned that US' policy toward North Korea has failed over the past 20 years and the US need a new approach to deal with North Korea. And he added by saying that "All options are on the table.", implying to take more aggressive approach.<sup>132</sup> In the meantime, the US announced that the main orientation of its policy toward North Korea would be

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<sup>131</sup> Aaron Blake, "Trump's Big-Stick Approach to North Korea Suddenly Becomes Extremely Literal," review of The Washington Post, January 3 2018, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/01/03/trumps-big-stick-approach-to-north-korea-suddenly-becomes-extremely-literal/?utm\\_term=.186930aecf3e](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/01/03/trumps-big-stick-approach-to-north-korea-suddenly-becomes-extremely-literal/?utm_term=.186930aecf3e) (Accessed January 7, 2018).

<sup>132</sup> Anne Gearan and Anna Flfield, "Tillerson Says 'All Options Are on the Table' When It Comes to North Korea," review of Washington Post, March 17 2017, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/tillerson-says-all-options-are-on-the-table-when-it-comes-to-north-korea/2017/03/17/e6b3e64e-0a83-11e7-bd19-fd3afa0f7e2a\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/tillerson-says-all-options-are-on-the-table-when-it-comes-to-north-korea/2017/03/17/e6b3e64e-0a83-11e7-bd19-fd3afa0f7e2a_story.html) (Accessed May 9, 2017).

‘maximum pressure and engagement’, indicating that US will strongly exert pressure on North Korea’s non-compliance but at the same time it will try to negotiate with North Korea to solve the ongoing nuclear issue. Indeed, US gradually increased the level of pressure by several means such as economic and financial sanctions, multiple shows of military force, and Trump even redesignated North Korea in the list of State Sponsor of Terrorism, which was removed during Bush’s term, on the grounds for the assassination of Kim Jong-Nam in Malaysia in February 2017.<sup>133</sup> While Trump administration clearly delivered its goal of denuclearization to North Korea, it also increased the level of punishment for North Korea’s noncompliance. In the meantime, President Trump himself has made threatening warnings to North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, otherwise North Korea will be faced with significant consequences by fire and fury with total destruction. Without listing exact timeline and punishment measures, Trump administration’s coercive messages were credibly delivered to North Korea. Regardless of the fact that Trump’s message had real substance to carry out, his tough words seemed to connote strong signals. Therefore, the US coercive diplomacy strategy toward North Korea during the first year of Trump administration is closely related to ‘Tacit Ultimatum’ rather than ‘Gradual Turning of the Screw.’

Moving on to Jentleson’s three variables of coercer state strategy, proportionality can be deemed as high since Trump administration pursued policy

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<sup>133</sup> Franz-Stefan Gady, "Us Designates North Korea as State Sponsor of Terrorism," <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/us-designates-north-korea-as-state-sponsor-of-terrorism/> (Accessed November 21, 2017).

change of denuclearization in North Korea. But the means to pursue this goal against much developed North Korea with higher nuclear capabilities compared to Bush administration's period require much more costs to achieve the goal. Furthermore, to convert Trump's hardline remarks into actions such as preemptive strike on North Korea, it would require lots of instruments and likely to be faced with strong oppositions from both internal and external factors. Polls has shown that most of the American opposed preemptive strike on North Korea although they felt threatened by North Korea.<sup>134</sup> So, proportionality can be degraded to the level of medium to low.

As for reciprocity, this turned out to be significantly low because Trump administration placed preconditions for resumption of direct negotiation, making zero progress. While Trump's team didn't deny diplomatic negotiation with North Korea, it hasn't made any efforts to provide any assurance measures to North Korea for the resumption of the talks, making situation in a stalemate.

Lastly, coercive credibility is solely high. Trump administration not only increased the level of economic and military pressure through bilateral and multilateral settings, but also it issued lots of stern warnings against North Korea's further provocations. International support seemed to be continuously supportive in denuclearizing North Korea. But it remains questions of whether neighboring countries

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<sup>134</sup> Scott Clement and Philip Rucker, "Poll: Far More Trust Generals Than Trump on N. Korea, While Two-Thirds Oppose Preemptive Strike," review of The Washington Post, September 23 2017, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-far-more-trust-generals-than-trump-on-n-korea-while-two-thirds-oppose-preemptive-strike/2017/09/23/5cc4377c-9fbb-11e7-8ea1-ed975285475e\\_story.html?tid=a\\_inl&utm\\_term=.664a7b66fa92](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-far-more-trust-generals-than-trump-on-n-korea-while-two-thirds-oppose-preemptive-strike/2017/09/23/5cc4377c-9fbb-11e7-8ea1-ed975285475e_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.664a7b66fa92) (Accessed January 7, 2018).



would support for Trump administration's possible offensive measures against North Korea in case of their provocations. Furthermore, China has still left traces of violation of UNSC sanctions such as shipments of petroleum to North Korea.<sup>135</sup> In the meantime, despite President Trump's faltering support rate in domestic politics, there hasn't been any prominent hindrance to pursue his policy. Regarding North Korea's counterstrategy of domestic economy, politics and role of elites, again, there hasn't been any remarkable changes made for the past few years.

Considering factors of Trump Administration's North Korean policy during the first year in Trump's presidency above, it seems quite similar with Bush administration's phase one (Jan 2001 – Oct 2006) except for few differences. Trump administration's strategy of maximum pressure and engagement for the last one year couldn't change North Korea's nuclear brinksmanship as well, nothing different from its previous government. What is probable at this moment is that Trump administration's hardline approach, including Trump's harsh talks on North Korea would be met with hurdles, which would only consolidate North Korea's solidarity and antagonism against United States. As Bush administration switched to accommodative policy due to facing challenges to implement hardline approach to North Korea after undergoing series of significant challenges ahead of it, it is possible that Trump administration would follow previous government's path of policy shift, which is related with much attenuated

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<sup>135</sup> Sang-Hun Choe, "South Korea Seizes Ship Suspected of Sending Oil to North Korea," review of The New York Times, December 29 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/29/world/asia/south-korea-ship-seized.html> (Accessed January 7, 2018).

negotiation-based approach. Therefore, if current situation goes on, in which US is tying up all available measures to pressure North Korea but there is lack of prominent efficacy in changing North Korea, Trump's team might consider suggesting direct bilateral negotiation with North Korea without preconditions by providing positive inducement measures by setting up negotiations as main instrument.<sup>136</sup> But again, the problem is how US successfully persuade not only North Korea but also its neighboring countries, especially China and South Korea, since strong multilateral support is the key to achieve denuclearization on the Korean peninsula. It remains to be seen whether Trump administration's hardline approach would work in the foreseeable future or it would also make policy shift toward North Korea.

Although the current administration has prominent features of unpredictability so that it is too early to analyze its North Korean policy, its predecessor's failure in policy toward North Korea would have drawn important lessons for those high-level officials in charge. The question is how US can skillfully deal with North Korea, which has been consistently non-compliant to agreements previous made, thereby making US to have absence of trust, and further to achieve its main goal of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula. And also, it depends on how US can balance its strategy of proportionality, reciprocity and coercive diplomacy, while inducing active international support and limited domestic opposition to pursue its goal with a strong impetus.

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<sup>136</sup> Mark Lander, "White House Corrects Tillerson on Whether U.S. Will Talk to North Korea," review of *ibid.*, December 13, [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/world/asia/north-korea-trump-tillerson.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/world/asia/north-korea-trump-tillerson.html?_r=0) (Accessed January 6, 2018).

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## 국문 초록

부시행정부의 대북정책은 이전 행정부의 관여 정책의 비효과성을 강력히 비판하며 강경책을 시행함으로써 북한에게 강력한 압박을 가하여 한반도의 비핵화를 달성하고자 하였다. 그러나 2006 년 북한의 1 차 핵실험을 계기로 미국의 대북정책은 강경책에서 온건책으로 전환하였다. 이러한 변화 가운데 부시행정부는 초기 동결조치 국면에서는 긍정적인 전망을 보이다가, 결국 임기 말 이전까지 북한의 불능화를 이끌어내는 데에는 실패하였다. 이러한 성공과 실패 요인을 분석하기 위하여 강압외교의 이론과 분석틀을 중심으로 연구하였다. 연구 범위는 부시행정부의 임기를 크게 세 시기로 구분하였다. 첫 번째 국면은 2001 년 1 월에서 2006 년 10 월까지로 이 시기의 미국 강압외교 전략은 암묵적 최후통첩이었으며, 전략 요소 중에 강압신뢰성을 제외한 비례성과 상호성이 결여되어 실패하였다. 두 번째 국면은 2006 년 11 월부터 2007 년 10 월까지로 기존에 비해 온건책으로 변화한 시기였다. 이 시기의 강압외교 전략은 점진적 나사조이기와 당근과 채찍 전략이 혼합되어 나타났고, 강압국 전략 요소 세 가지가 모두 균형되게 유지됨과 동시에 국제적인 공조가 이루어져 북한의 동결조치를 이끌어 내는데 제한된 성공을 하였다. 세 번째 국면은 2009 년 11 월부터 2009 년 1 월까지로 시도 후 관망 전략을 사용하였으나, 상호성과 강압신뢰성이 저하되어 전략의 균형이 깨졌고, 주변국으로부터의 강한 지지를 이끌어내지 못하여 결국 불능화에 실패하였다. 이 글에서는 결국 미국의 강압외교 전략은 세 가지 요소인 비례성, 상호성, 강압신뢰성이 균등 되어 이것이 적극적인 국제적 공조 및 국내 지지와 결부된다면 강압 외교가 성공할 수 있음을 주장하고 있다.

주제어: 부시 행정부, 대북정책, 강압외교, 1차 핵실험, 비핵화, 불능화

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